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No 7, July 1985



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No 7, JULY 1985

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'THREATENING' U.S.-FRG ALLIANCE DISCUSSED

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[Article by A. N. Yakovlev: "The Dangerous Axis of American-West German Militarism"]

[Text] The 40th anniversary of the defeat of fascism reminds us again and again of that inordinate price paid by the peoples of the European continent, and primarily by the Soviet people, for deliverance from Hitlerism--this shock detachment of imperialist reaction. Whatever the attempts by bourgeois ideologists to rewrite history, the fact cannot be erased from the memory of mankind that our contemporaries in Europe and elsewhere owe, to a decisive extent, their freedom and the possibility of living and progressing in peaceful conditions for four decades now to the first socialist state in the world.

Falsifiers remain falsifiers, and history remains history.

In the latter part of the 20th century mankind has felt the salutary effect of real socialism on world development more strongly than ever before and in a far greater number of concrete manifestations. Won at the cost of great sacrifice, untold suffering and deprivation, and incredible exertion of strength by the Soviet people and anti-fascists throughout the whole of Europe, the great victory created a new situation in the world arena--in favor of socialism, democracy and peace.

The correlation of forces that has taken shape as a result of the war and postwar development, strategic parity and inevitable retribution restrain imperialist bellicosity, make the unleashing of a new world war difficult and doom to failure the adventurist plans of those who have once again ventured upon a dangerous game with the idea of achieving world domination. The united economic, political and military might of the states belonging to the socialist community and their consistent peaceful policies continue to protect the peoples of the world against a nuclear catastrophe.

But the possibility of eliminating war from the life of society once and for all has not yet become reality. The danger of war remains, and in recent years this danger has increased. If one pays attention to facts, there is no doubt as to the sources of the threat to the existence of the human race, a

threat that has now clearly and visibly emerged. The entire experience of the 20th century shows that the real source of the military catastrophes that have twice shattered the world, particularly Europe, is imperialism, the vitality of which feeds on militarism and violence. Once again, as in Germany during the 1930's and 1940's, the most extremist, the most bellicose, aggressive and chauvinist policies for the development of contemporary capitalist society are becoming interlaced in the social structure, economic relations and policies of imperialism, and primarily in its metropolis--the United States. Precisely here lies the danger that is once again looming over the world.

Of course, today the situation in the world is cardinally different from that which characterized the eve of the first or even the second world war. And Washington's policies are not a simple "repetition of the past." American imperialism has created an unprecedented structure for military and political confrontation with the socialist system: the NATO bloc with its numerous offshoots as the main strike force; the system of military bases scattered around the world; every possible kind of regional association; and various forms of military-integrative compulsory agreements--all this is oriented toward destroying military-strategic parity, achieving American world hegemony and ultimately ensuring global social revanche.

As during the "cold war" years, Washington strives to turn Western and central Europe into the main field of military and political confrontation with socialism; in point of fact this is assisted by Bonn. Attempting to utilize the irrepressible and unsatisfied ambitions of West German imperialism and revanchism in order to harness them to the aims and interests of American foreign policy is by no means alien to Washington.

The activation of West German revanchism poses a particular danger to peace in Europe. Now not only former Nazis and land unions [zemlyachestva] are infected with this political illness, but also the hierarchy of the ruling Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Speaking in the Bundestag at the end of February 1985, Chancellor H. Kohl declared the "German question open" and talked of a "new peaceful settlement for Germany," "under the German roof" at that, and, finally, of some kind of "demarcation line running between East and West" that is unacceptable to him. Surely this is akin to an appeal to redraw the map of Europe to American-West German design?

I

The shortsightedness of U.S. leaders can perhaps be explained, although by greatly stretching a point, if only by the fact that this country has never known devastating wars on its own territory and has never seen the mounds of corpses, stone skeletons of cities and truncated destinies of children. Germany has experienced all this, and to the full extent. One can only be staggered by the limitless irresponsibility of those West German politicians who once again fill the earth of this country with gunpowder and are so eager to fence it in with a palisade of nuclear missiles.

German imperialism, as is well known from the experience of the past, has always been distinguished by its particular aggressiveness and adventurism.

The deep roots of this aggressiveness are connected with the belated development of capitalism in Germany and with the fact that the German monopolies, to quote a graphic expression of V. I. Lenin, arrived "at the capitalist banquet table when all the places had been taken."¹ German monopolist capital deemed the existing division of the world unjust and twice tried by force to divide the world anew, but both times suffered crushing defeat.

American imperialism, which developed rapidly and powerfully, was also "done out of its fair share" of colonies and in 1898 unleashed the first imperialist war in history for a redivision of the world (the Spanish-American War). Unlike German imperialism, however, it had greater room for maneuver and felt secure on the other side of two oceans. In addition to this, it objectively turned out that American imperialism was able to make the transition to the stage of neocolonialism earlier than others, with the aid of an extensive set of instruments and exploitation of the peoples of Latin America and other continents.

Imperialist Germany cherished hopes of a redivision of a divided world through force and arms, and what was involved here was not merely stagnant thinking. Germany did not have a territory similar to Latin America nearby. For this reason it counted on changing the situation in Europe and its colonies with the use of military force. If the close and wide-scale ties between the leading concerns of both countries are taken into account, the hopes of Wilhelm II's government of keeping the United States out of World War I were not at all groundless and indeed the United States entered the war only when Germany's doom began to be clearly apparent on the stagnating fronts. It was necessary to save capitalist Germany and at the same time to hinder excessive strengthening of its imperialist rivals--Britain and France--which was not, of course, part of the calculations of U.S. ruling circles. Germany was prostrate and writhed in convulsions. The American ruling clique needed a strong, aggressive state in the center of Europe, and everything was done to revive it.

In the 20th century the alliance between the two largest citadels of world imperialism became an important policy-forming factor which manifested itself with particular force in the periods of exacerbation of the crisis of the capitalist system and of the most active mobilization of its reserves against the world of socialism, social progress and democracy. The American-German alliance largely predetermined the rebirth of German militarism and the arrangement of military and political forces in the camp of imperialism between the two world wars.

In essence, the restoration and development of German militarism would not have been possible without the active participation of American imperialism. The U.S. monopolies helped to solve the problem of reparations in such a way that German industrialists were given a completely free hand in the matter of reviving the German militarist machine. Charles Gates Dawes, the owner of the Chase National Bank, who occupied the post of U.S. vice-president from 1925 to 1929, headed the international committee of experts specially created by the Allies to resolve the so-called reparations questions. It was under his leadership that decisions were made which actually removed the limitations on the development of Germany's military-industrial potential. The "Dawes

plan" simultaneously consolidated the German monopolies' dependence on their American creditors and led to the acquisition of important levers of influence on the German economy and to the introduction of American capital into the country's economy. As a result, ties between the financial capital of Germany and the United States were strengthened, ties which survived World War II and which ensured the support of the German monopolies by the United States even after the rout of Hitler's fascism.

Enormous assistance was provided to Germany's foreign policy, which was aimed entirely at restoring its economic and political positions in the world and at creating preconditions for revanchism, whatever this might have cost the German people. Of decisive importance was the West's aspiration to set Germany against the Soviet Union and to "channel" its aggression in an eastern direction, against the world's first socialist state. The fact that the United States was also behind the "Munich policy" of appeasing Hitler can hardly be seriously disputed. The failure of this policy and subsequent events led to the United States being drawn into World War II. As early as in 1945, when the last salvos of the war had only just died away, the American General G. Patton stated that the true adversaries of the United States were not the Germans but the Russians.²

Such statements were not slips of the tongue. They reflected the real, far-reaching policy of the American ruling elite. The United States developed a "Cold War" on a wide front with the aim of revising the results of the war, which had led to widespread democratization all over the world, to an enormous growth in the influence and authority of socialism and to the collapse of the colonial system. In this connection the United States strove to make West Germany the main stronghold of the "Cold War" in Europe.

The establishment of the American diktat in Western Europe, and the United States' undivided control over the internal situation in West Germany in the early postwar years, as well as the rebirth of German militarism, became the most important elements and the leading reference-points in the United States' postwar policy and the key component of its aggressive course in this region after 1945.

The main thing that attracted Washington to West Germany was its considerable military-economic potential, its human resources, its military-strategic position on the European continent and also the traditional influence of the military in this country. In September 1950 the governments of the victorious Western powers made a decision on "limited and controlled arming of West Germany" and on its participation in the "combined armed forces," that is, within the NATO system. The program of remilitarization of this country began to be implemented. In May 1955 the FRG officially became a member of the North Atlantic bloc. The Paris agreements were based on a tacit deal between Washington and Bonn, whereby the FRG acquired relative freedom of action in Europe by agreeing to follow Washington's course.

The tangle of contradictions here was not a simple one. The revival of a militarily powerful West Germany hardly corresponded to the interests of the West European countries, primarily France and Britain, but they were forced

to follow the lead of the United States. Moreover, a justification was also found: The Americans rapidly borrowed from Hitlerite propaganda the bugbear of the "Soviet threat," which for all the 40 years since the war has served the most aggressive military circles as a cover for the arms buildup and the preparations for a new war.

After the FRG had joined NATO, the process of its remilitarization was accelerated. In point of fact, Bonn's political aspirations began to be concentrated on demands for the restoration of the 1937 borders, and primarily on the adventurist idea of "reunification," by which the absorption of the GDR was understood. By the beginning of the 1960's the policy of revanchism and militarism had effectively turned the FRG into a threat to peace and security in Europe and into the basic support for the American policy of "cold war" on the European continent. The FRG's attempts to gain access to nuclear weapons, based on its military alliance with the United States, represented a particular danger. This purpose was served by the intensively developed plans of the early 1960's for the creation of multilateral NATO nuclear forces.

The nuclear ambitions of German militarism demonstrated once again its inherent adventurism. The revanchists did not conceal their aims. The main thing, as the West German journal *WEHRKUNDE* wrote, is to "carry out a nuclear attack against an enemy at the right time and in the most effective way."³ These were certainly not harmless fantasies. The journal created "nuclear retrospectives" on World War II: Leningrad, which was blockaded by the Germans by September 1941, could have been wiped out quickly by nuclear attacks. The liquidation of the "cauldrons" of encirclement at Kiev, Bryansk and Vyazma in fall 1941 could have been carried out in a few hours rather than weeks with the use of nuclear weapons. The time won in this manner would have allowed the Nazis to complete their operations even before the onset of the fall season of bad roads and the beginning of winter. Such are the wild ideas arising in the inflamed brains of present-day militarists, who are prepared to push mankind back into the abyss of war, and nuclear war this time.

One is struck time and again by the gullibility of some West European politicians who, despite the harsh lessons of history, present matters in such a way as if to say that this time they will be lucky and the revived strength of West Germany will be directed exclusively at the East. As we can see, history teaches little to those who stubbornly refuse to be taught.

In conjunction with the United States, the FRG played an important role in the adoption in December 1969 by the NATO bloc of the decision on the lowering of the so-called "nuclear threshold," that is, on the first use of tactical nuclear weapons against the Warsaw Pact countries.

The course of events, however, forced the West German leadership to weigh their opportunities and make certain changes in their plans from time to time. The correlation of forces in the world changed, and far from in favor of the adherents of revanchism. The international position of socialism grew stronger. The process of the "agonizing reappraisal of values," which led to the formation of the SPD-FDP government and to the involvement of the FRG in European detente, was not only long but also painful and complex. It had many causes of a multifaceted nature.

Influential circles in the FRG became increasingly irritated by its position as a subject country. The status of a "pawn in the game of others" suited them less and less. The FRG ruling circles laid claim to a weightier position in European and world politics. At this level, the conclusion of treaties with the USSR and other socialist countries substantially strengthened Bonn's position with regard to the other Western countries, including the United States.

However, even in the conditions of detente of the 1970's, the political and military leadership of the FRG continued to follow the "two-tier" strategy (detente and force), which was reflected in the "Declaration on Atlantic Relations" approved in June 1974. This noted that the development of the Allied Armed Forces could not be changed "in the course of present or future negotiations" with the socialist countries. On the basis of this concept, the government of the FRG strove in every way possible to strengthen its position in NATO within the framework of the American-West German alliance. To be more specific, this period is characterized by the fact that West German generals and officers began to acquire important command posts in the integrated (combined) armed forces of the North Atlantic bloc considerably more often.

The "two-track" decision of 1979 on the siting of new American first-strike nuclear missiles in Western Europe was prepared by joint American-West German actions in NATO. The meaning of this action is simple; it was to change the existing balance of nuclear weapons and the entire strategic situation in favor of the United States and NATO to the detriment of the security of the USSR and other socialist countries.

The ruling circles of the FRG were willingly led by the most reactionary circles of American imperialism, and that will never be forgotten. On the territory of the FRG, 96 cruise missiles (out of a total of 464 in Western Europe) and all 108 Pershing II launchers are based. The fact that West German territory was made available for the siting of nuclear missiles which introduce a new and essentially negative quality to the military-political situation in the world and on the continent marked the start of a stage in the aggressive military cooperation between the FRG and the United States which was much more dangerous than ever before.

The American-West German axis thus has very solid economic and political foundations. Its roots go deep into history. And its revival in the postwar period, and also its recent activation are no accident. Today there is every reason to say that the ruling monopolist circles of the FRG have not drawn the proper lessons from the experience of the past, although these lessons were more than instructive. Historical blindness has again gained the upper hand in those responsible for the fate of the West German state.

II

The present harshly confrontational course of U.S. ruling circles, which arose under various influences, of which the most important is the stubborn unwillingness to become reconciled to objective sociopolitical shifts in the world,

is pushing mankind step by step toward the brink of the nuclear abyss. It is natural that such a course is meeting with growing resistance from peace-loving forces in America itself, and that its champions are short of allies and like-minded people both at home and abroad.

This is why rightwing extremist forces in the United States are seeking a closer union with conservative military-political circles in the FRG with unusual activeness. In turn, the West German leadership's orientation is being urged on to an increasingly noticeable extent to fit Washington's aims, while the leadership itself is increasingly clearly becoming a captive of the ideology and policy of the most reactionary circles of American imperialism, thus seriously forgoing the national interests of its own country.

The shift to the right in Bonn's political line, a shift which is connected with the implementation of NATO's plans, revived revanchism and militarism, the actions of which are so tragically imprinted in the consciousness of the peoples of Europe, in an obvious manner. The foundations of the contemporary militarist alliance between Bonn and Washington are connected, as has already been stressed, with the peculiar features of the military-political development of the FRG over recent decades.

Equipped with the latest weapons systems, the Bundeswehr long ago turned into the backbone of NATO in Europe, exceeding the armed forces of the other West European countries in numbers. By the beginning of the 1980's the Bundeswehr's share in the combined armed forces of NATO in Europe comprised over 25 percent of all combat aircraft, more than 50 percent of all ground forces, 55 percent of all artillery, 60 percent of medium tanks, and so forth.⁴

The priority of the United States as far as financing military preparations is concerned is irrefutable. The FRG occupies second place, after the United States, in volume of military expenditure in NATO. Its contribution to the NATO infrastructure program is especially significant. Providing almost one-third of expenditure for these purposes, it occupies first place here among the European participants in the bloc. In 1984 the last restrictions were removed concerning production of the latest weapons in the FRG--and far from defensive ones at that.

West German militarism is supported by a mighty economic and technological base which has no equal within Western Europe. The FRG's gross national product amounts to three-quarters of the combined gross national product of Great Britain and France. It surpasses Great Britain and France taken together in industrial production. Its superiority in foreign exchange reserves is even greater. According to an evaluation by the European Managers Forum, the FRG is in fourth place (after the United States, Switzerland and Japan) in the capitalist world in terms of competitiveness, far outstripping France (19th place) and Great Britain (14th).⁵

The government of the FRG has not only become involved in new twists of the arms race developed by the United States and NATO, but in a number of cases also acts as its initiator. The lion's share of American weapons and units of the general-purpose grouping of forces is situated on West German territory (out of 350,000 personnel stationed in Western Europe, more than 250,000

American servicemen are in West Germany). There are 188 U.S. military bases functioning here. These troops and bases fulfill a double function: They serve as a strike force for possible use against the socialist countries and at the same time as a means of military control over the political life of that country.

The West German rulers have not abandoned their hopes of turning Western Europe into a sphere of their own decisive influence, and they are paying a very dear price for this ephemeral dream, a price which includes the country's national interests and the adoption of the role of a prisoner condemned to nuclear death in the American plans for a new world war.

At the same time, it is necessary to emphasize that the coordinated offensive of reaction--both from across the ocean and at home--is giving rise to growing counteractions by democratic forces in the FRG. The West German Communists, a considerable number of the Social Democrats, representatives of the trade unions, the "Green" party, various youth organizations and pacifist, religious and other movements are creating a perceptible counterbalance to reaction and militarism, and to preparations for war and the siting of "Euromissiles." This makes the political picture in the FRG highly complex, mixed and contradictory, and forms the potential for anti-American, anti-Reaganist and peaceful tendencies in the country.

The widening of the joint action by the United States and the FRG within the NATO framework is being supplemented by the development of military and military-political ties at a bilateral level. The Bundeswehr is equipped with large volumes of American weapons, primarily aircraft and missile systems. The FRG occupies first place in Western Europe in purchases of American weapons. West German military personnel are trained at U.S. military bases and training grounds. Joint military-technological research and projects are carried out.

At the beginning of the 1980's new steps were taken to widen the joint actions by the United States and the FRG in the military sphere. To be specific, in April 1982 an agreement was signed between the United States and the FRG "On Support in Case of a Crisis Situation or of War," that makes Bonn responsible for supplying and servicing American troops in a crisis situation. The agreement is based on the premise that the number of American occupation troops on West German territory can be increased by more than two times in the space of 10 days "by the start or expected start of combat actions," and that weapons and military equipment for six additional divisions will be delivered to the stockpiles in West Germany in good time. The American-West German "Agreement on the Air Defense of Central Europe on the Basis of Partnership," signed in July 1984 in Washington by the defense ministers of the two sides, places on the West German Armed Forces the task of air cover of American military bases in West Germany with "Roland" missile systems and "Patriot" launchers, the latter having been specially bought for this purpose in the United States.

The FRG's military preparations considerably exceed its defense requirements, but they form an organic part of American militarist plans, and this means that West Germany, by will of its military-economic and political elite, is placed in humiliating dependence on the aggressive strategy of the American ruling clique.

The military and political cooperation of Washington and Bonn is also aimed at the suppression of progressive processes and the democratic and antiwar movements, and at slowing down economic development and social progress in Western Europe. On the orders of the United States, and with the most active participation of the FRG, the NATO bloc has actively opposed both directly and indirectly the participation of communists in the governments of Italy and France, and continues to make particular efforts to undermine the authority and influence of all progressive forces on the West European subcontinent.

By its very nature, however, capitalism does not have serene relations within its own system, and it is constantly torn by inter-imperialist conflicts. The centripetal tendencies now dominating in U.S.-FRG relations at the official, government level are accompanied by marked centrifugal tendencies. The latter are gathering force. The ineradicable competition leaves its mark on both the political potential of the FRG's militarism and the military cooperation between Washington and Bonn itself. Each of the partners is striving to achieve its own aims, which far from always coincide, and each is striving to get the other to pull its chestnuts from the fire. Washington is striving to make Bonn constantly increase its military spending (3 to 4 percent increases annually, according to calculations of real spending). The American Government periodically demands that the FRG participate in military operations outside NATO's zone of action, and is drawing the country into the "crisis strategy" of the United States.

Even the most servile West German leaders understand that such intentions are contrary to the FRG's fundamental interests. Of course, the government of that country is not enthusiastic about the U.S. plans to turn its territory into a theater of military operations, including the "limited" nuclear military operations, because it realizes that an attack by the United States on the USSR and its allies would result in catastrophic consequences for West Germany, which is filled with American nuclear weapons. Moreover, an aspiration to achieve greater equality in American-West German relations and to lower the level of subordination is becoming increasingly and clearly apparent among the FRG ruling circles.

The American leadership realizes this and is taking steps to securely fasten the FRG in the web of Atlantic ties and obligations. It is heating up in various ways the nationalist feelings in West Germany and uses the pliancy of that country's ruling circles to the ideas of chauvinism, thereby essentially engaging in the revival of revanchism. Speaking at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe in January 1984, the U.S. secretary of state expressed doubts about the Allied Yalta and Potsdam accords on the postwar settlement in Europe by calling the division of Europe and of "one of its big states" the "source of instability and tension." Afterwards, analogous statements, including those at the highest level, continued to be made in the United States throughout 1984.

Perceiving the opportunities opened up by the American approach, revanchist forces in the FRG intensified their onslaught. Pretensions to the 1937 borders of the German Reich, to the restoration of "justice" for "all Germans without exception," and so forth were once again heard in official

declarations. The aspiration to revise the results of the war are characteristic not only of the successors of the defeated German militarists, but also of their current patrons, the U.S. extreme rightwing circles that are now in power. Repeating and confirming his Stockholm escapade, G. Shultz proclaimed in August 1984: "We will never reconcile ourselves to the idea of a divided Europe." And the leaders of the "seven," meeting in Bonn in May 1985 to celebrate the Day of Victory over Fascism "in their own way," also raised their hands against the territorial realities in Europe.

Facts remain facts. They show that West German revanchism is actively stimulated by American "revisionism," as this phenomenon is sometimes called in the West, and is closely connected with it.

III

The exacerbation of inter-imperialist contradictions places an increasingly heavy burden on the Washington-Bonn militarist axis, a burden that threatens to deform it. However, as has already been said, the interests of both participants in preserving and strengthening this structure continue to be dominant for the time being. It is important for the United States to keep the FRG as the main territorial, economic, military and political base of American hegemony in Europe. The FRG continues to have an interest in the patronage of its senior partner and in the support for its own plans to win dominant positions in Western Europe, exploiting in this connection a certain kind of political "forgetfulness" of its partners.

It should also be kept in mind that American-West German relations are developing in close correlation with the exacerbation of contradictions between the two leading "power centers" of contemporary imperialism: the United States and Western Europe. These contradictions that have provided the grounds for their politicians on both sides of the Atlantic to express their concern about a "crisis of the alliance" affect virtually all spheres of mutual relations; that is, the economic, military-political, purely political and even ideological spheres. Imperial and hegemonist pretensions and ambitions are evident in Washington's approach toward its West European partners and competitors. The U.S. global strategy has assigned the West European countries the role of "junior partners," obedient as far as possible and not daring to put their own national interests above American interests.

Dissimilar processes are also developing in Western Europe itself, both in the individual countries of that region and in relation to the integrative processes. Differently perceived in the domestic and foreign policies of West European countries and in the reaction of the U.S. ruling circles to new phenomena and to the West Europeans' counterreaction to Washington's position, the processes that are taking place contribute to the further exacerbation of inter-imperialist contradictions and increase complications in inter-Allied relations.

What characterizes them in this decade?

First, a sharply widening circle of problems that reveal diverging interests and increased conflicts over the principles of economic relations and security in the nuclear era;

Second, the fact that political disagreements are accompanied and deepened by increasing economic contradictions in the period of crisis of the capitalist economy;

Third, the fact that the very process of elaboration of a coordinated course on specific policy problems and its implementation is becoming increasingly difficult for the United States and the West European countries and that clashes occur in this connection although accord is preserved in relation to the general goals of their class political strategy;

Fourth, the fact that the political disagreements between the United States and its European partners are more likely to involve issues that had formerly seemed clear and simple and provided at one time the reason for the formation of NATO, that is, relations with the Soviet Union and other European socialist countries;

And finally, fifth, the fact that the state of affairs in this connection is affected by U.S. attempts to widen the "sphere of responsibility" of NATO, extend the activity of the bloc beyond the originally outlined boundaries, and in fact force Western Europe to service U.S. military needs in various regions of the world to the detriment of Western Europe's own interests. This also stimulates disagreements between the allies.

As a result of all this, the North Atlantic bloc now faces the need to solve the most difficult problems, the like of which have perhaps never before existed in the history of that group. Judging by all available evidence, it will not be an easy task to overcome them.

Henry Kissinger was one of the first persons in the United States to sound the alarm in this connection. Answering a question on the prospects of American-West European relations in an interview given to the French journal *POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE* in November 1982, he said that "between Europe and the United States there is virtually complete disagreement in all spheres, be it in the spheres of East-West relations, strategic problems and international trade or in the spheres of the Middle East and Central America."⁶ Another member of the American academic community, R. Tucker, writes: "The growing rate of disintegration (of the North Atlantic alliance--A. Ya.) cannot but make an impression even on the most unbending optimists. It is an inescapable reality that Western Europe and, what is most important in this connection, West Germany are as devoted to the detente that developed at the end of the 1960's as they are devoted to the Atlantic alliance.... As long as this situation exists, the corrosion of the Atlantic alliance will continue."⁷

What does all of this show? It indisputably shows that contradictions among the Atlantic allies are growing stronger and deeper, that they are widening and that Western politicians and political scientists not only recognize this fact but are also seriously worried about it. These contradictions manifest themselves especially distinctly in the sphere of military-political relations between the United States and its European allies. The American doctrine of first use of nuclear weapons leaves the United States the right to decide when and how nuclear weapons will be brought into action.

It is gradually turning out that this situation no longer corresponds to the views and appraisals, adhered to by political leaders of West European countries, about a possible outbreak of conflict in Europe. Trying to find a way out, these leaders first embarked on the road of more closely tying their countries' security to the security of the United States. However, misgivings soon arose that the American war planners are aiming at exposing Western Europe to a nuclear strike and "limiting" the conflict by destroying its territory and annihilating its population. It is mainly these misgivings that have put representatives of a number of West European countries more and more on guard in relation to the confrontational trends of U.S. policy and in relation to an unprecedented raging of threats and use of military force, especially against the socialist states.

This guarded attitude is quite widespread in West European public circles. For instance, M. Howard, an Oxford University professor,⁸ notes that, in the eyes of Europeans, the Americans are no longer "the same people who had come to Europe to help it deal with the postwar devastation. It is a different generation." This generation remembers Vietnam and the incessant American militarism and today it remembers Grenada, Lebanon, Nicaragua and so forth. This generation also has new points of reference. In the opinion of many Europeans, the Americans have come to Europe to wage "their own war" in which Europeans have no interest and from which they will be the first to suffer.

The understanding of the simple truth that the American monopolies that determine the U.S. political course in the international arena pursue first and foremost their own mercenary interests is breaking its way into the frame of mind not only of political scientists, but also that of the realistically inclined faction of the ruling circles of West European states.

They are beginning to understand that the sharp turn in the American strategy since the end of the 1970's is not only connected with the striving to achieve military superiority over the USSR, but is also aimed at restoring the monopolist position of the United States in the capitalist world. American imperialism is taking a number of measures in this direction, measures that are calculated to undermine the competitive ability of its West European allies. These measures include the imposition of enormous military expenditures that place a heavy burden on the economies of West European countries; attracting West European capital to the United States by means of high interest rates; attempts to undermine economic relations with the socialist countries; and the introduction of restrictive protectionist measures in trade with West European countries and threats of restrictions in the sphere of scientific-technical exchange.

The arms race absorbs an average of 3 to 6 percent of the gross national product of the leading West European countries and about one-third of their state budgets. It diverts labor, intellectual, capital and energy resources and raw materials for unproductive purposes and thereby reduces the possibilities for solving urgent social and economic problems.

With its spiralling interest rates, the United States is inflicting yet another blow to the economy of Western Europe, this time by means of a flow

of capital. According to the Federal Reserve Board, in the pursuit of higher interest rates the West European countries deposited a total of more than 300 billion dollars in U.S. commercial banks in the 1979-84 period,⁹ and another amount of more than 60 billion dollars in direct capital investments¹⁰ as well as portfolio investments and the purchase of American state loan bonds which must be added to this figure. The latter signifies that West European countries are covering a part of the U.S. budget deficit, which is closely associated with the enormous increase in military expenditures. The Reagan Administration has already spent a trillion dollars for these purposes.

The United States also strives to undermine the competitive ability of Western Europe by disrupting the latter's economic relations with the USSR and other socialist countries. First, it is expanding the list of Cocom "controlled" products in order to limit exports of West European advanced technical equipment and technology to the USSR. Second, it tries to limit West European countries' imports of energy resources from the USSR. Third, it continues to call for limiting credit relations with the USSR and other socialist countries. Fourth, the United States is introducing a "monitoring" system. In other words, it is assuming control not only over the business deals of its own firms with the USSR but also over those of West European firms.

The forces ruling the U.S. decision and all advocates of strengthening "Atlantic solidarity" were unpleasantly surprised by the fact that the aggravation of the international situation provoked by Washington has not led to an alleviation of inter-imperialist contradictions, as in the past. On the contrary, these contradictions have intensified.

All this and many other elements are forcing the U.S. plutocracy to increase its attention to its policy toward Western Europe; to try to use its available means of influencing its NATO allies more effectively; and to draw the most valuable and loyal among them closer to itself. And here the FRG has advanced to the forefront.

Members of the Reagan Administration miss no opportunity to express their satisfaction with the political behavior of the incumbent leaders of West Germany and to emphasize the concurrence of the policies of both countries on the most important international problems. The U.S. secretary of state's press conference during his official visit to Bonn can serve as an example of this: "I do not believe," he said, "that there are any major differences between the U.S. and FRG strategies. We are constantly consulting each other and try very carefully to coordinate our viewpoints. And I think that the way in which our affairs are conducted reveals nearly an unprecedented accord and, in the final analysis, unity of views on the question of what we should do."¹¹ Shultz did not fail to mention the "excellent" work of the FRG Government in preparing for and carrying out the placement of U.S. first-strike nuclear weapons in its territory and in this connection he made a demagogic reference to the "people": "We are delighted with the way the German people handled the question of deployment."¹²

The present West German leadership provides grounds for this condescending pat on the back. Considering the statements of some West German leaders,

they are most literally repeating the theses and arguments that have already been expressed by the Americans.

An analysis of U.S.-West German relations shows that, despite the intensification of competition and the growth of contradictions on a wide range of problems, the tendency toward joint actions against the forces of socialism, freedom, democracy and social progress is still clearly dominant in these relations. The importance of the FRG as an ally increased in the political platform of the American ruling circles as the FRG's position on the European continent grew stronger. The special value of West Germany in the eyes of the American ruling elite was traditionally determined by the former's geo-strategic position, economic and military potential, experience in the conduct of operations in the East and aspiration to jointly strengthen the positions of world imperialism. Now, in line with the aforementioned considerations, increasingly great significance is attached to its position and possibilities as the West European center of inter-imperialist rivalry on the inevitable restructuring of relations between the leading imperialist "power centers."

However, there are varied appraisals of the FRG's role in the contemporary world and of the goals of American policy in relation to West Germany which are current among U.S. ruling circles. Believing that the strengthening of all elements of capitalism and a consistent development of relations between them, on the basis of the greater responsibility and role of its new centers, correspond to the interests of capitalism as a system, some political figures think that the FRG can relieve Washington of some part of its financial and political burden and exercise an influence, beneficial to Washington, on the West European integrative process and rule out its autonomous development. These circles admit the possibility of developing American-West German relations in the spirit of a real partnership. Other representatives of influential American circles are not inclined to trust the FRG and suspect it of a potential betrayal of American interests; of inclination to neutralism; and so forth. They demand that the FRG's policy be constantly controlled and that the FRG be forced to strictly follow Washington's line within NATO. What is involved in the final analysis, however, is the intent of the United States to finally and definitely transform West Germany into a junior partner of a new type, a partner that would be economically, politically and spiritually Americanized, and, at the same time, into a support base for military control over Western Europe.

Bonn's Western policy and, first and foremost, its relations with the United States are invariably based on common class interests and on Bonn's aspiration to link the allies with the fulfillment of its central political task of changing the situation that came about in German affairs after World War II and closing the so-called German question by liquidating the socialist achievements of the GDR. The development of its large-scale military cooperation with the United States and NATO is expected to serve this purpose too. The idea of revanche is underpinned by a many-sided militarist foundation based on the Washington-Bonn military alliance of an openly antisocialist nature. This very clear coordination of the FRG's own goals with its participation in NATO has contributed to a further development of the FRG's dependence on the United States, despite the fact that the former's enhanced position in NATO should stimulate, it would seem, the opposite processes.

This truth was once again confirmed by the visit of FRG Chancellor H. Kohl to the United States at the beginning of December 1984 and by the statements made during that visit. The NATO bloc's fundamental goal of increasing both its nuclear missile weapons and its conventional weapons was wholly and completely confirmed. The FRG chancellor did not miss the opportunity to confirm "complete agreement," "identity of interests" and "ardent support" for the U.S. policy. In this connection, the assiduity and manner of these assurances fully reflected the position of Washington's hostage, in which the FRG has objectively found itself since the very beginning of the deployment of the new U.S. first-strike nuclear weapons on its territory.

The gap of principles between what is now being said in Bonn and, less frequently, in Washington about aspirations toward detente, disarmament and peace, on the one hand, and NATO's practical military preparations, on the other, is perfectly obvious to any observer with the slightest degree of objectivity. The American-West German militarist axis that is preparing to pull the deadly chariot of nuclear catastrophe invariably occupies the central place in these preparations.

The conviction of a considerable part of the FRG's ruling oligarchy that the FRG must be an unwavering NATO member and a loyal executor of Washington's instructions has found its expression in the views and policy of the present West German Government.

Thus, the American-West German militarist alliance is assuming threatening outlines. The policy aimed at achieving military superiority over the Warsaw Pact countries is jointly implemented. The American ruling circles' encouragement of, and support for, the nationalist and revanchist feelings in the FRG are especially dangerous in this connection. The palisade of nuclear missiles erected in the territory of West Germany also says a great deal.

In this century Europe was the scene of two most bloody and destructive world wars, but in the 1970's it also became the cradle of detente. Now, when the U.S. and NATO reactionary forces are speeding up preparations for a new war and using for this purpose the well-worn track of American-West German military-political cooperation, it is especially necessary to remember what the European people had to endure, suffer and experience in the recent past, and the wounds that are still bleeding today. However, this does not trouble the politicians on the other side of the ocean. Europe's tragedy is not their tragedy. The homage paid by R. Reagan to SS murderers in Bitburg attests to more than just his own personal view of the world. It also attests to the long-term strategy of American imperialism, aimed at uniting any and all forces of reaction around the policy of a "crusade" against communism.

As has been emphasized more than once by its leaders, the Soviet Union continues to be devoted to the goals and ways of peaceful all-European cooperation; the policy of the relaxation of international tension; and the cause of the radical reduction (up to complete liquidation) of existing weapons, both nuclear and conventional. The USSR perceives normal and constructive mutual relations between the continent's states as a mighty barrier on the path of the militarist plans of nuclear adventurists.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 32, p 83.
2. Quoted in PRAVDA, 18 January 1985.
3. WEHRKUNDE, 1960, No 7, p 331.
4. MEMO, 1985, No 1, p 60.
5. WIRTSCHAFTS WOCHE, 25 January 1985, pp 26-32.
6. POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, Autumn 1982, p 24.
7. "The Atlantic Alliance and Its Critics," COMMENTARY, May 1982, p 72.
8. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Winter 1982/83, pp 309-322.
9. Calculated according to data in "Federal Reserve Bulletin," 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984.
10. Calculated according to data in SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, 1980, No 9; 1981, No 11; 1984, No 6.
11. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, February 1984, p 10.
12. Ibid.

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STRATEGIC PARITY--A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR A SAFE WORLD

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 85 (signed to press 17 Jun 85) pp 39-50

[Article by V. F. Petrovskiy]

[Text] The realities of the nuclear missile age demand recognition of the fact that a most important prerequisite of international security is the military-strategic balance (approximate parity) between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, on the condition that there is no increase, but an even reduction in the arms of the two sides.

As is well-known, the Soviet Union has never aspired and does not aspire now to superiority. It was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress that approximate parity exists between the USSR and the United States and that it could be firmer if appropriate treaties and agreements were to be concluded.

The strategic balance is a widely acknowledged fact of the present military-political situation in the world. Decisions of the 37th (1982), 38th (1983) and 39th (1984) session of the UN General Assembly, which reflect the opinion of members of the international community, unequivocally state that the USSR and the United States "at the present time possess equal nuclear military might and, as would seem obvious, general approximate parity exists between them."¹

The military-strategic balance by no means signifies absolute, mirror-like exact quantitative and qualitative parity of arms between the two leading powers and military blocs, which in many ways is explained by the different geostrategic positions of the two sides and by the different histories of their technical development. The balance implies that, by taking these and other factors into account, the quantitative and qualitative differences and structural disparities in sum are mutually balanced, and also that, as a whole, both the nuclear forces of the USSR and the United States and the power of the two military alliances are approximately equal.

The strategic balance also has broader significance than simply that of the approximately equal total correlation of the arms complex. Approximate military-strategic parity signifies a guaranteed opportunity for either side, if it should become the victim of nuclear aggression, to preserve sufficient means in order to carry out a counterstrike capable of causing the aggressor irreparable damage. In other words, under the conditions of the present balance neither side has the potential for a disarming nuclear missile strike.

Given the existing level of the nuclear potential of both sides, a first strike signifies the ruin of the second side because there is no means of effective defense. In the terminology adopted by the West, this is known as a situation of "mutual assured destruction." In a political sense, "mutual assured destruction" has been considered until recently by the United States to be the most effective means of "mutual deterrence."

Of course, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the concept of "deterrence" is untenable. Its unleashing of a nuclear war would run counter to the fundamental principles of its foreign policy and, as is well known, the USSR has officially assumed the unilateral obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

What is more, the Soviet Union is against maintaining the situation of "mutual assured destruction" and preventing peace on this basis. The aim of its policies is not to perpetuate nuclear weapons as a deterrent force, but to exclude them from the arsenals of states and ultimately totally liquidate them. However, in a military sense the concept of "mutual deterrence" is a recognition of the objective fact that in the conditions of a balance of forces, unleashing a nuclear war would be equivalent to suicide.

The idea is sometimes expressed that, with the strategic balance, a nuclear war is supposedly totally impossible because no one will dare to unleash it. But arguments such as these suffer from oversimplification. The factor of adventurism, which is organically inherent in imperialism, also retains its significance in the situation of a strategic balance. It is characteristic that even American advocates of the concept of a "strategic balance," who declare in words the necessity of reducing the possibilities and incentives for carrying out a first strike on a strategic level, at the same time acknowledge the expediency of the first use of nuclear weapons under certain conditions in the theater of military operations, primarily in Europe. What is more, it is essential to also consider the possibilities of political misunderstandings, accidental computer errors and military conflicts in various regions, which, considering the mutual dependence that now exists, could easily develop into general conflict. In other words, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the mechanism of "mutual deterrence" provides no absolute guarantee against a nuclear conflict.

By virtue of this, while recognizing the great role played by the strategic balance as a factor in international security, one must not, however, regard it as some kind of ideal situation or as a 100-percent reliable guarantee of security. It merely represents a certain borderline, proceeding from which it is essential to strive to reduce and ultimately totally eliminate the threat of nuclear war. All the necessary prerequisites for this do exist.

First, the strategic balance creates certain objective conditions for curtailing fruitless and dangerous competition in the military sphere. It forms the basis of the 1972-1974 series of bilateral agreements between the USSR and the United States which have held the arms race in check, and primarily in its most dangerous--nuclear--sector. Reaching these agreements was possible owing to the adoption of the principle of parity and equal security as the

basis for mutual relations between the USSR and the United States in the military-political sphere. Parity in the given context signifies real, rather than arithmetical, numerical military-strategic parity, approximate parity with consideration for the differences in geographic position and in the historical features of the development of the military potential and armed forces of the USSR and the United States. Equal security means that any measures in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament must be strictly balanced and implemented in equal, proportional parts, so that at no stage in lowering the level of military confrontation can either side gain a unilateral military advantage. In this respect, agreements must proceed from the fact that the various indexes, taking in the aggregate and relating to weapons systems and also geostrategic circumstances, ensure parity and equal security for the Soviet Union and the United States. In other words, both sides of the scale must be really balanced.

The indissoluble interdependence of two concepts, basic parity and truly equal security, within the framework of a unified principle is a most important characteristic of this principle. Not only the USSR and the United States gain from the observance of the principle of parity and equal security, but also every other state in the world.

Consequently, this principle represents one of the main foundations of universal security in the nuclear missile age.

The strict observance of this principle under the conditions of a strategic balance will open up possibilities for gradually lowering the level of nuclear confrontation while constantly maintaining the present military balance. It is important that the Soviet-American SALT II Treaty, while consolidating the existing strategic balance on the basis of this principle, also envisaged continuing negotiations. These would reach further agreement on vital reductions and qualitative limitations of the strategic weapons of both sides in this most important area of nuclear confrontation and stimulate efforts in other spheres of restraining the arms race. By the end of the 1970's, considerable progress had been made in coordinating a draft treaty between the USSR, the United States and Great Britain on a general and complete ban on nuclear weapons tests, the conclusion of which would make the further perfection of these weapons impossible.

If the SALT II Treaty had been ratified and negotiations on a general and complete ban on nuclear testing had been brought to a successful conclusion, a favorable starting point would have been created for really lowering the levels of nuclear confrontation. To this were added the prospects of success which appeared at the end of the 1970's in the matter of banning and liquidating nuclear weapons, further strengthening the regime of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, restricting the sale and supply of conventional weapons and limiting and subsequently reducing military activity in the Indian Ocean.

Second, the strategic balance and, what is more, at the lowest possible level, is an important prerequisite for lessening political confrontation and intensifying the process of detente. Precisely this is attested to by the

development of interstate relations in the nuclear-space age. The process of detente began in the second half of the 1960's, when the strategic balance had already formed; it developed successfully during the 1970's, when this balance had been consolidated. The phases of political and military detente do not necessarily coincide exactly in time, but their close interdependence and mutual influence are obvious. The steady, long-term development of detente requires progress in both directions. When the possibility of military detente became apparent at the end of the 1970's, this opened up prospects for further strengthening political detente.

The strategic balance is not a frozen, static state. The military-strategic balance is dynamic by virtue of its very nature. Attempts by the United States and its NATO allies to gain military superiority by means of implementing various arms programs give rise to countermeasures by the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies--measures aimed at restoring the military balance and preventing the West from gaining unilateral advantages.

Safeguarding the strategic balance is incompatible with the concept of a "balance of fear," which, by feeding on the idea of "mutual deterrence," creates the cult of nuclear deterrence. The nuclear bomb, called the "Big Bomb" with capital letters by apologists of "deterrence," is simultaneously declared both a "unique threat" to mankind and an "unprecedented acquisition," a "blessing" and some kind of guarantee of international security under the conditions of the nuclear-space age. The logic of deterrence, advocates of the concept of a "balance of fear" explain, requires one to treat the opposite side approximately thus: "Do not touch me or I will kill both of us." This gives rise to the conclusion that the threat of mutual annihilation forces the preservation of peace.

The peace referred to by advocates of this idea is at best an absence of war, and not the maintenance of normal, equitable relations between states and the development of cooperation on the basis of full parity and mutual benefit. Supporters of the concept of a "balance of fear" take for granted a state of tension and confrontation in relations between states with different social systems.

As far as security is concerned, its guarantee is in fact connected, in the concept of the "balance of fear," with preserving and, as the arms race is escalated, with increasing the danger of nuclear war. As P. Nitze frankly admitted in December 1983 when he was interviewed by DER SPIEGEL, "the chief means of preventing a nuclear war is deterrence.... It is not arms control that has great significance, but the nuclear threat."²

In the name of maintaining the potential of deterrence, the concept of a "balance of fear" prescribes relying on the firm guarantees of destruction. In accordance with this concept, the more nuclear missiles there are, the more weighty "nuclear deterrence" becomes and the more reliable security will be. At the same time, this concept proceeds from the necessity to demonstrate willingness to bring nuclear missile arsenals into operation. For this purpose, it is claimed, it is not only essential to threaten and blackmail, but

also to carry out actions demonstrating the ability for irresponsible acts, adventurism and unpredictable conduct.³

Saturated with the idea of mutual intimidation, the concept of a "balance of fear" is basically fallacious. It gives rise to an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion. It would be erroneous to believe that fear of a nuclear war prevented a new catastrophe since World War II. The reason for this is the predominance of peaceful forces over the forces of war. The prospects for the future would be too gloomy if, as a basis for peace, one had to rely on the threat of nuclear devastation, which is, moreover, constantly increasing.

"History," N. Rao, head of the Indian delegation, justly remarked during the debates at the second special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament, "teaches us that the military and political strategies of so-called deterrence clear the way for developing weapons and using them in war...and basically represent doctrines of terrorism practiced by states."⁴

The cultivation of nuclear weapons, a most important component of the concept of a "balance of fear," is rightfully regarded by all sober-minded politicians and scientists as the main flaw in this concept.

The concept of a "balance of fear" makes the military-strategic balance shaky and unstable, excludes the possibility of imparting a constant, stable nature to it and gives rise to the temptation among aggressive imperialist circles to alter this balance in their favor with the aid of the arms race, thereby damaging the interests of international security.

Fear, noted A. A. Gromyko, is never a good counselor. Political and state leaders who are really aware of their responsibility to their peoples are expected to form their actions in such a way as to give people a feeling of confidence about the future. In this lies the source of creative energy, necessary in any task, and especially in the construction of peaceful relations between states. The philosophy of fatality is alien to the Soviet Union and its policies. It also rejects the policy of a "balance of fear" and of building up tension.

Rejecting the idea of "mutual deterrence," sober-minded political figures justly point out the fact that the concept of a "balance of fear" cannot ensure stable international security because the realization of its postulates in practice objectively undermines the strategic balance. The UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar spoke convincingly on this subject at the 39th session of the UN General Assembly on 12 December 1984: "In the final analysis, the search for real stability through nuclear deterrence is neither desirable nor practicable. It is undesirable because the values and ideals of mankind are incompatible with the danger of the annihilation of millions of our fellow citizens. No humane society which recognizes the worth of the individual can even contemplate taking such action. And at the same time, the very fear and hatred of the enemy capable of inflicting such a blow could destroy the foundations of civilized society."⁶

In the nuclear and space era, strategic balance also raises new questions about military superiority.

Preponderance in arms and armed force has no practical meaning from the viewpoint of common sense. It is often heard that the days when victories in wars were won by means of quantitative advantages--be it in the number of combat elephants or in the number of rifles, sabers or bayonets--have been relegated to the property of history. The arguments are also convincing that, in view of the fact that the USSR and the United States have already stockpiled enough nuclear weapons to annihilate all life on our planet several times over, it is meaningless whether either of the sides possesses military superiority over the other side or to what extent this superiority has been achieved. The fact that the saturation of our planet with nuclear weapons has reached a peculiar threshold and that each of the sides has the capability of "super-destruction" is cited in confirmation of these arguments. What is the purpose of striving to exterminate the adversary 5, 10 or 50 times over when one-time destruction is enough? One really does not have to be a military expert or scientist to understand that a further increase in weapons is senseless and that the very concept of military superiority is ephemeral as regards the possibility for multiple destruction. And yet, the United States has made the achievement of a position of superior military strength the main goal of its policy. Washington officials, including those of the highest ranks, do not hide this intention. The reliance on military superiority has been confirmed in the most important political documents. This is primarily connected with the aggressive essence of American imperialism and its aspiration to world domination by means of military force. However, this is not the only thing that is involved here.

It is believed in Washington that the quantitative factor has not lost its significance even in view of the gigantic scale of already existing nuclear potential. There it is claimed that it is not unimportant, either politically or militarily, how many nuclear warheads are aimed at this or that target or region of the other side, or at how many targets or regions they are aimed. The program of increasing the quantity of nuclear warheads, which is now being carried out by the United States, signifies in itself an essential increase of the nuclear threat.

Equal, and perhaps even greater, significance is attached to the qualitative aspect of the matter. The development of nuclear weapons systems has now reached the point where they could acquire new qualities capable of altering and increasing the potential for their usage. The qualitative arms race is regarded by the United States as a technological war, from which it expects to emerge the victor.

Programs for the modernization of strategic nuclear weapons have been developed by the present administration and have basically already been passed by the American Congress. They are oriented toward perfecting intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's) and heavy bombers and significantly increasing the accuracy of targeting and the yield of nuclear warheads. What is more, these programs also envisage the production and deployment of many thousands of long-range land-, sea- and air-based cruise missiles with similar operational characteristics.

Now plans for building a large-scale antimissile system, which has been christened "defensive," have been added to the programs for modernizing

strategic weapons. But the appellation for this program does not change its special purpose. Like the program for offensive strategic weapons, this plan in actuality signifies the formation of a totally new potential, intended, by virtue of its qualitative parameters, for carrying out a first, disarming strike; that is, for striking the strategic systems, command centers and communication media of the other side with the aim of depriving it of the ability for a counterstrike.

It is precisely in outstripping the Soviet Union in both qualitative and quantitative parameters with the aim of gaining the ability to carry out a first strike, weaken the strength of a counterstrike and reduce it to some theoretically acceptable level that the meaning of that military superiority to which the United States aspires lies.

The current U.S. formulation of the question of "deterrence" is frequently accompanied by sharp criticism of the existing situation of "mutual assured destruction" as standing in the way of building a large-scale antimissile system and, accordingly, by a revision of the former interpretation of "deterrence," which presupposed carrying out only a nuclear counterstrike against a potential enemy. Whereas earlier, "deterrence," in accordance with the American military doctrine, had to be based on the threat of "assured destruction" in strategic respects and on a "balance of fear" in the moral-psychological respect, now, as some American theorists and politicians believe, this is no longer adequate. For "deterrence" to be "effective," it must, in their opinion, be based not simply on the threat of nuclear war being waged directly, but also of a first nuclear strike being carried out with impunity. And although this new approach is called the concept of "mutual assured survival," one does not need special insight to see that it is a question of utilizing nuclear might not as a political deterrent factor, but for its direct military purpose.

This is a highly symptomatic move by U.S. military strategy in the direction of still greater aggressiveness and adventurism. In the situation of "mutual assured destruction," deterrence has (if only on the theoretical level) a mutual nature. But in the second case, the symmetry of deterrence is broken. As American strategists themselves have acknowledged, military strategic parity with the USSR was sufficient as a material basis for "mutual assured destruction." For the new situation of "mutual assured survival," however, this is insufficient from their point of view. Military superiority is necessary for the realization of this strategy.

As far as the political aspect of the matter is concerned, the position of superior military strength is, from the American point of view, a means of blackmailing and bringing pressure to bear on those countries whose policy is not to Washington's taste. The United States also regards nuclear superiority, which it would like to use as a Sword of Damocles, as a means of bringing about a fundamental change in the policies of states belonging to a very different social system. The United States ultimately wants to liquidate this very system in order to pursue a policy of diktat and coercion with impunity in relation to other countries and peoples.

The course adopted by the United States and NATO to gain military superiority in quantitative and qualitative parameters over the USSR and the other socialist countries is extremely dangerous in many respects at the present level of development of scientific-technological potential.

From a military point of view, changing the nuclear equation destroys the symmetry of "mutual deterrence" and increases the probability of a nuclear conflict by several orders, to use mathematical terms.

By creating a situation of strategic instability, a course aimed at gaining military superiority makes inevitable the uneven development of the arms race and the more rapid replacement of some weapons systems by other, more perfect systems. Attempts to make a breakthrough in just one class of weapons entail the necessity for a fundamental restructuring of a number of others. In the conditions of a destabilization of the strategic situation, the monstrous potential for destruction looming over mankind also acquires its own special inertia of further perfection and renewal, thereby increasing the possibility of a military cataclysm.

On a political-diplomatic level, destabilization of the strategic situation destroys the foundations of international trust, leads to chronic international crises, increases the tension which has already reached a dangerous level and shelve the resolving of urgent problems common to the whole of mankind, such as development, food, the elimination of the most dangerous illnesses and the protection of the environment.

Those who gamble on military superiority are prisoners of self-deception. No one can count on attempts to gain an advantage in military respects remaining without the fitting response. The experience of recent decades has shown that building up nuclear arsenals is not only incapable of ensuring the military superiority of any side, but that it also cannot serve as an instrument for achieving any rational goals.

There have been examples in history where states aspiring to military superiority through the creation of potential which, in their opinion, this superiority guaranteed, have easily yielded to the illusion of their impunity. However, retribution inevitably befell them. And the lessons of the nuclear age convincingly attest to the futility of attempts to gain positions of superior military strength.

The United States, as is well known, has expended unprecedented effort in order to accomplish a "technological spurt" and create some kind of "absolute weapon" which could be used both in direct military conflict and as a means of political blackmail. It is also a well-known fact that these attempts are doomed to failure. What is more, Washington has not succeeded in retaining and preserving its monopoly on the most powerful forms of military equipment, which it possessed in the first year after World War II--primarily on nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them. The development of military equipment and the appearance of the most destructive means of waging war have led to a certain devaluation of these means and to a narrowing of the sphere in which military might can be used for rational policy goals. The

presumption of American strength in the postwar period has repeatedly been disgraced.

Under the conditions of the present correlation of military forces in the world arena, attempts to gain a strategic advantage with the aid of the latest weapons systems are all the more senseless. It would be naive, to say the least, to suppose that the opposite side will sit idly by and calmly watch the United States gathering unilateral advantages.

The result would not be a change in the correlation of military forces in favor of the United States, but simply a reproduction of the balance at a higher and consequently more unstable technological level. And this is acknowledged by competent figures in the West who realistically appraise the present situation in the world. "All that we will achieve," said the former U.S. ambassador to Moscow, T. Watson, for example, "will be a useless waste of necessary resources and an increased danger of accidental nuclear confrontation."⁷

However carried away by its pursuit of the chimera of military superiority, Washington is wrong in dangerously exaggerating its own potential and equally dangerously underestimating the potential of the other side. The desire for military superiority does not become less dangerous because of its hopelessness. With the inevitable restoration of the military-strategic balance, its level rises still higher. However, in this respect the threat of sliding into the nuclear abyss increases because the higher the mountains of weapons, the more likely they are to crumble.

This does not mean, of course, that countermeasures to restore the balance are inexpedient. No, they are necessary. Not to adopt these measures would mean consenting in advance to the balance being undermined and, consequently, to an even greater threat to security than that posed by a rise in the level of this balance. One has to choose the lesser of two evils. This is how the Soviet Union responds to U.S. attempts to gain superiority with the aim of pursuing a policy of blackmail and diktat.

"In the nuclear age," it is pointed out in the letter of the permanent USSR representative to the United Nations of 8 May 1984, "the security of one state cannot be ensured either by creating a threat to other states by means of gaining military superiority over them or by reproducing the 'balance of fear' at an increasingly higher level."⁸

The viewpoint of the Soviet Union corresponds to the interest of all peoples of the world. "Long-term international peace and security," it is stated in the final document of the first special session on the UN General Assembly on disarmament, "cannot be founded on an accumulation of weapon stockpiles by military alliances and cannot be maintained by the shaky balance of deterrence of doctrines of strategic superiority."⁹

The degree of security in the world is in direct proportion to the level at which approximate military parity is maintained. Consequently, the interests of ensuring reliable universal security not only require the maintenance of

of this parity, but also a consistent lowering of the levels of military confrontation and the strengthening of security and trust in the process of this balance. In other words, security in the nuclear age cannot be ensured by means of destabilization but, on the contrary, by means of safeguarding strategic stability, and at ever lower levels.

As early as the 1960's sober-minded political figures in the United States and other Western capitalist countries came to recognize the necessity to ensure strategic stability in the conditions of the existence of nuclear weapons and super-accurate missiles. The SALT II Treaty directly states that "strengthening strategic stability is in the interests of the sides and the interests of international security." Today all those who take a position of political realism are in favor of the level of the military balance gradually dropping and strategic stability thereby being strengthened.

The question of strategic stability occupied a prominent place at the Soviet-American talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons (START) in Geneva in 1982-1983, which provide a graphic demonstration of the two fundamentally different approaches to the problem. At these talks the Soviet Union consistently strove to strengthen strategic stability by means of lowering the level of nuclear confrontation, curtailing the strategic arms race and adopting effective measures aimed at preventing crisis situations and building confidence. The draft treaty submitted by the USSR delegation envisaged steadily reducing confrontation between the USSR and the United States in the sphere of strategic offensive weapons in strict accordance with the principle of parity and equal security. At every stage of the reduction proposed by the Soviet side, parity would have been maintained between the two sides in relation to the number of strategic vehicles and the nuclear warheads on them. The balance of forces thereby ensured would have objectively helped to strengthen security and strategic stability.

The aims of strengthening stability were met by the Soviet Union's comprehensive approach to resolving the START problem, in accordance with which all strategic weapons in the aggregate would be subject to limitations and reductions without exception and with no arbitrary exemptions for any types of weapons. This would have closed all channels for evading or undermining future agreement by engaging in the further mass deployment of such weapons, including new types.

The interests of stronger strategic stability also dictated the Soviet approach, which envisaged taking into account in START issues such a factor in the strategic situation as the existence, in the United States, of forward-based nuclear weapons capable of reaching Soviet territory.

The Soviet proposals proceeded from the fact that stability and the arms race are incompatible. They set up a barrier to the strategic arms race in both quantitative and qualitative respects. The Soviet Union regarded the implementation of the program of measures proposed and aimed at reducing the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war, strengthening trust and avoiding the possibility of incorrect interpretations of the other side's actions as an important contribution to the consolidation of strategic stability. The particular

value of this program consisted in the fact that it envisaged concrete steps for real limitations of some types of military activity.

Expressing itself in favor of stabilizing the strategic situation, the United States in practice led matters to the destruction of stability and to an increase of the threat of nuclear war. It was interested not in strategic stability but in changing the existing approximate parity in the military-strategic sphere and in acquiring unilateral military advantages to the detriment of the USSR's security interests. This was done with the preconceived interpretation of the concept of "balance" and by removing from the complex question of parity those of its component parts which make security truly equal.

The American side stubbornly insisted on dividing strategic weapons into "more" and "less" destabilizing ones. Its aim here was obvious: to break the structure of the Soviet strategic potential and, first and foremost, to liquidate its basis, which was land-based ICBM's. In this connection the differences in the existing structures of the two sides' strategic forces, and also the fact that all these types will become equally dangerous as a result of the process by which the characteristics of types of strategic weapons become more similar, were intentionally ignored.

Unlike the Soviet approach, which envisaged strict limitation of the number of new types of ICBM's and SLBM's, the U.S. proposals did not set any limits here. The American side was essentially striving to gain a completely free hand in creating and deploying new types of strategic offensive weapons, such as long-range cruise missiles of all basing modes and air-to-ground ballistic missiles.

In accordance with this American approach, almost all Soviet strategic systems were regarded as "destabilizing" while the American ones were regarded as "stabilizing." Evidence of the U.S. administration's lack of interest in solving the tasks of strengthening strategic stability was also provided by its negative attitude toward the measures proposed by the Soviet Union to strengthen trust. The American proposals, unlike the Soviet ones, did not limit the sides' military activity, but only amounted to the exchange of information between them on some types of such activity. Thus, Washington graphically demonstrated its unwillingness to strengthen strategic stability.

Proceeding from the fact that the problems of strengthening stability and limiting and reducing strategic weapons must be solved on the basis of consideration of the factors which determine the strategic situation, the Soviet Union constantly emphasized that the implementation of the strategic arms reductions proposed by the Soviet side would be possible only on the understanding that the United States at least did not build up its other nuclear weapons capable of reaching targets on the territory of the USSR. The Soviet Union also proceeded from the necessity of ensuring strategic stability at the talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe. Its approach envisaged comprehensive examination of medium-range nuclear weapons, missiles and aircraft situated in Europe. Reduction to an equal lower level would make it possible to ensure stability in Europe for a lengthy period.

At the talks the Soviet Union was striving to reach an agreement based on the principle of equality and mutual security which would strengthen stability in Europe, and this can be seen from the proposals it advanced. It stands to reason that in this connection it was necessary to account for British and French nuclear weapons as well as the American ones. Both the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies emphasized that a solution to the question of nuclear weapons in Europe could not be found under conditions which would upset strategic stability.

The United States' approach and its concrete proposals were frankly oriented toward upsetting the existing balance of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The United States was also trying to achieve this with the help of the so-called "zero option," which envisaged the liquidation of Soviet medium-range missiles not only in the European part of the USSR but also on its entire territory, while preserving all existing nuclear weapons on the NATO side. Also, with the help of the "interim" decision, the United States could deploy its new Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe to supplement the American nuclear missiles already situated there.

To justify this line both at the talks on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe and at START, the Americans advanced the same thesis about the need to primarily examine the "most destabilizing weapons," which, they asserted, include land-based, medium-range or, in American terminology, intermediate-range missiles. The USSR, they declared, had a "destabilizing monopoly" on this class of weapon. This selective approach, which took no account of the nuclear weapons of the United States' allies and which left aircraft outside the bounds of the limitations, was also subordinated to the idea of upsetting the balance of forces in Europe in favor of the United States and of NATO in general.

As M. Shulman, an expert on Soviet-American relations, justly remarked, "if our leading political figures and the public really agree with the premise that a stable nuclear balance guarantees our security more reliably than regulated rivalry, it follows from this that we must agree to stability, parity and mutual deterrence. We agree to them verbally, but our actions are not guided by them."¹⁰

The deployment of new missiles which the United States has begun in a number of countries in Western Europe, at distances from Soviet territory which have made them acquire the nature of strategic missiles with regard to the USSR, signifies the appearance of a destabilizing factor. The United States is already talking about also siting analogous nuclear weapons on American bases in the Far East and in the Indian Ocean, thereby creating an additional strategic threat to the Soviet Union in the eastern and southern sectors, that is, along literally every azimuth. Thus, not only is the nuclear danger in Europe being acutely exacerbated, but a direct attempt is being made to undermine strategic stability on a global scale.

The United States' hope of changing the military-strategic balance both on the European continent and all over the world is fundamentally illusory and is fraught with the most dangerous consequences.

Another result of the deployment of new American missiles on the European continent is the increase in the threat of nuclear attack for the peoples of the countries of Africa and Asia, who are within range of these missiles.

The appearance of new American medium-range missiles in Europe does not further the strengthening of the United States' own security either. There are fewer and fewer people left in the United States who are blinded by great-power chauvinism and who, like Defense Secretary C. Weinberger, believe that if a nuclear war starts, it may pass America by, and it will be possible to fight only "to the last European." Now not only Western Europe has been transformed into a hostage of the Pentagon's adventurist plans; the population of the United States is becoming a hostage of the present administration's reckless policy.

As Soviet leaders note, a nuclear attack on the USSR and its allies would inevitably lead to a swift counterstrike against the territory where the missiles are situated and against the territories from which the commands to use them are issued.

The countermeasures taken by the Soviet Union in order not to allow the United States to achieve military superiority are aimed at ensuring the security of the peoples of the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community. At the same time, they objectively correspond to the security interests of all peoples of the world. Like the liquidation of the American monopoly on the nuclear bomb at one time, the Soviet Union's present countermeasures save other countries from the nuclear diktat and blackmail of the United States and prevent adventurist steps. As a result of the measures implemented by the Soviet Union, the nuclear balance is being restored, but, of course, at a higher level.

The raising of the military-strategic balance to new levels, and increasing the threat of military conflict, strengthens neither security nor strategic stability. Strategic stability is the result of a comprehensive balance of strategic offensive and defensive weapons. For this reason, violation of it in the sector concerning defensive weapons, and primarily a wide-scale antimissile defense system, upsets the strategic balance as a whole.

The existing situation is justly recognized to be dangerous and abnormal by all sober-minded politicians and scientists in the West. Repudiating Washington's course of destabilization, they are demanding a return to the path of maintaining strategic stability. In this connection, however, the problem of strategic stability continues to be interpreted by them at a narrowly technical level, as the highlighting of "destabilizing" weapon systems. There is no practical sense in such an approach. Strategic stability is upset not by any individual systems, but by the qualitatively new round of the space and nuclear arms race unleashed by Washington.

Under present conditions, which are marked by the development of the arms race in all its coordinates, and when its vertical direction is aspiring toward outer space, the interests of strengthening strategic stability call for efforts aimed at resolving questions relating to nuclear and space weapons in their interconnection.

In the opinion of the Soviet Union, the new Soviet-American talks, which the sides began on 12 March in Geneva, on a whole complex of questions concerning nuclear and space weapons are expected to serve the strengthening of strategic stability.

The March 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum confirmed once again the principal tenet of Soviet foreign policy, according to which the USSR does not seek unilateral advantages for itself. This approach to ensuring strategic stability corresponds to the interests of ensuring reliable universal security in the nuclear missile age.

FOOTNOTES

1. UN documents A/Res/37/100B of 13 December 1982, A/Res/38/73E of 15 December 1983 and A/Res/39/63C of 12 December 1984.
2. DER SPIEGEL, 12 December 1983, p 126.
3. Following this logic, according to the authoritative evidence of one of his closest associates, H. R. Haldeman, President R. Nixon believed in the "mad president theory," according to which enemies may submit to the will of a president if they believe that he has lost his sanity and is prepared to risk nuclear carnage for the sake of some limited gain for his own country.
4. UN Report A/S - 12/PV9 of 11 June 1982, pp 77-78.
5. PRAVDA, 24 April 1984.
6. UN document 39/SG/SM/3635, DC/1785, 12 December 1984, p 2.
7. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 19 January 1981.
8. Letter of the permanent representative of the USSR to the United Nations of 8 May 1984.
9. Resolutions and decisions of the 10th special session of the General Assembly of 23 May-30 June 1978. UN document A/S - 10/4, N.Y., 1978, p 5.
10. HARPER'S MAGAZINE, April 1984, p 18.

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IMPORTANCE OF POTSDAM DECISIONS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 85 (signed to press 17 Jun 85) pp 51-64

[Article by V. M. Berezhevskiy]

[Text] The Berlin (Potsdam) conference of the leaders of the three Allied powers, the USSR, the United States and Great Britain, which was held from 17 July to 2 August 1945, has, just as the Yalta conference, become the subject of heated debates in our day. Mountains of myths, distortions, misunderstandings and deliberate misinformation have been heaped up around the decisions of both conferences. Some in the West have attempted to belittle the importance of the Potsdam conference by describing it as a mere reaffirmation of the Yalta agreements. Others allege that Potsdam was simply the scene of confrontations between the victors. Z. Brzezinski, for example, stated in an article in FOREIGN AFFAIRS that "only arguments about the division of the spoils" took place in Zeppelienhof Palace.¹ All of these comments are supposed to discredit the Potsdam decisions, to divert public attention from the crux of the matter and to conceal the fact that the principle of mutually acceptable agreements between states with differing social structures triumphed once again in Potsdam.

The Potsdam decisions are exceedingly important because they secured the historic victory of the people of the USSR and other countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and outlined a program for a just and lasting peace.

The collected documents of the Berlin (Potsdam) conference, recently published by the Political Literature Publishing House, will give a broad range of readers an opportunity to learn about the discussions and decisions that have secured a peaceful life for the people of Europe for two generations now. The collected documents also demonstrate the efforts made by the Soviet delegation to extend the wartime relations between the three powers to peacetime.²

Bourgeois propaganda argues that peaceful coexistence by different social systems is impossible. The cooperation of the war years was supposedly an exception to the rule, engendered by the presence of the common threat posed by the fascist "Axis." The proponents of this thesis allege that confrontation, and not cooperation, is characteristic of our "divided" world. When the same Brzezinski demands the renunciation of the legacy of Yalta and Potsdam, he

asserts that Europe will overcome its "division" only when the "alien system" disappears from the East European countries.³ He suggests a number of ways of attaining this goal.

In this case, Brzezinski can be given credit for his indisputable service in being perhaps the first to explain in simple terms the implications of the complaints voiced in West European capitals and overseas about the "division" of Europe. This is obviously a new attempt to eliminate the socialist order from the European East in one way or another. This is the reason for the attacks on the Potsdam decisions, which reflected the new balance of power in Europe in favor of progress and socialism. These decisions cogently testify that representatives of the United States and England then had to acknowledge the facts at the end of the war and conclude mutually acceptable agreements with the Soviet Union. Some people in the West now want to forget this.

Political Reversal in Washington

The situation on the eve of the Potsdam conference was different in many respects from that preceding the previous meeting of the leaders of the three Allied powers in the Crimea. The main difference was that hostilities in Europe had ceased. The USSR and its allies had won a victory in the gravest of wars. This war decided the fate of the world's first socialist state and the future of world civilization, progress and democracy. In order to win, the Soviet people had to bear most of the burden of the battles and suffer colossal sacrifices. Now the time had come to secure the victory won at such a high cost, to guard the Soviet state and all peaceful nations reliably against new encroachments by reactionary forces and to establish the conditions for a lasting peace.

The Soviet Union adhered to a principled peaceful policy throughout its history, and the war years were no exception. Proceeding from this line, the USSR urged joint action by the Allied powers. The agreements concluded at the conferences of the members of the anti-Hitler coalition in Moscow, Tehran, Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta reflected the interests of all sides. They embodied the principle of equality, although the Western powers had their own opinions about specific aspects of warfare and postwar construction. It was not a simple matter to conclude the agreements. It required patience, goodwill, reasonable compromises and the desire to reach a consensus. It was important that the U.S. Government was headed by a politician as realistic as Roosevelt. By taking a firm stand, he, in contrast to Churchill, contributed much to the eventual adoption of mutually acceptable decisions.

Roosevelt was no longer alive at the time of the Potsdam conference. The American delegation was headed by the new President, H. Truman. British Prime Minister W. Churchill attended only the first part of the conference. After his election defeat, he was replaced by C. Attlee, the leader of the victorious Labour Party, who began to represent England on 28 July. The appearance of these and other new political figures affected the proceedings of the conference.

It is quite significant that a political reversal began to take place in Washington long before the Potsdam meeting, essentially at the time when

Truman entered the White House. This entailed a departure from Roosevelt's adherence to the principle of equality in relations with the Soviet Union. Roosevelt's colleagues were replaced by advocates of the "hard" line. Soon after Truman took office, he set forth his beliefs in a conversation with the U.S. ambassador to the USSR, A. Harriman. In reply to Harriman's remark that "both sides will have to make concessions in the mutual bargaining process," the President stated that although he did not expect 100-percent Soviet agreement to the American terms, he was hoping for 85-percent agreement.⁴ In this way, the line of overt diktat was chosen.

Truman demonstrated his "tough" approach when he received People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs V. M. Molotov in the White House after Molotov arrived in the United States in April 1945 to attend the UN conference in San Francisco. The new President, with his lack of foreign policy experience, decided to rehearse the discussion in the presence of his closest advisers. Secretary of State E. Stettinius, Secretary of War H. Stimson, Secretary of the Navy J. Forrestal, General G. Marshall of the Army, Ambassador A. Harriman and others were invited to a conference in the White House. Truman announced that he was prepared to "fight with the Russians" over Poland, even at the risk of the USSR's refusal to join the United Nations.⁵ The President stressed that he intended to carry out American plans for the new international organization under any circumstances, and said that if the Russians did not want to join, they could "go to Hell."⁶

Truman was apparently encouraged by the fact that many influential people in Washington, who had criticized Roosevelt for his intention to continue cooperating with the USSR after the war, were increasingly insistent in their demands for confrontation. Republican Senator A. Vandenberg, for example, reasoned that "Russia might leave. If it leaves, the conference (in San Francisco--V. B.) can go on without Russia.... We will stand by our guns.... This is precisely the time to take a stand and stop pacifying the Reds before it is too late."⁷ The aim was to exclude the socialist power from the world community. The absence of the USSR would allow Washington to dominate the United Nations completely. Definite efforts were made to create the United Nations without the Soviet Union and, essentially, against it.

After stating his position, Truman asked the people attending his conference to express their opinions. Stimson recommended a more cautious approach, reminding the President that the USSR had always kept its word in important and major military matters, and had even done more than it had promised on several occasions. "The United States," he explained, "could be in hot water if Russia's true feelings about Poland are not investigated in full."⁸

Stimson was obviously disturbed by the "crude frankness" Truman proposed to employ in his talk with the USSR people's commissar of foreign affairs. He wrote the following about the "inevitable" confrontation with the Soviet Union in his diary: "Our orbits do not come into geographic conflict, and I believe that we could avoid all types of conflicts in the future."⁹

General Marshall also preferred a more discreet approach. "I am not familiar with the political situation in Poland," he said, "but from the military

standpoint I believe that it would not be wise to start a fight with the Russians because Stalin could delay in entering the war against Japan and we would have to do the whole dirty job ourselves."

Forrestal expressed a different opinion. "I believe," he said, "that the Soviet Union is convinced that we will not object if it includes Eastern Europe in its orbit. For this reason, it would be better to confront them now than later."

During this discussion, Truman promised not to issue any ultimatums. He said that he would be firm, but not aggressive.¹⁰

When Molotov entered the President's office that day, Truman immediately, as he later put it, "took the bull by the horns." He expressed his regrets over the lack of progress in the talks on Poland and blamed it on the Soviet side. The President then said that American policy had to have the "trust and support of the American public" and that Congress would have to make the decisions on any kind of postwar economic assistance. He, Truman, saw no chance of pushing these measures through the Capitol without public support, and he added that the Soviet Government should bear this in mind.¹¹

This was an obvious threat to employ economic sanctions against the USSR. The Soviet representative replied that the only acceptable basis for cooperation would demand that the governments of the three powers treat one another as equals: It would be unacceptable for one or two of them to impose their will on a third. The Soviet Government could not be accused of violating agreements just because the other partners had changed their point of view.

When Harriman described this meeting later, he remarked: "I was sorry that Truman took such an unyielding approach to the matter. His behavior gave Molotov reason to inform Stalin of a departure from Roosevelt's policies."¹²

In essence, Truman's departure from Roosevelt's line became a fait accompli. By that time, political thinking in Washington already revolved around the idea of confrontation with the USSR. Acting U.S. Secretary of State J. Grew composed a memorandum on 19 May 1945, stating that war with the Soviet Union was inevitable. Speeches about postwar construction were being made on the stage of the San Francisco Opera House, where the UN conference was being held, but Grew was proposing that as soon as the conference was over, "American policy toward Soviet Russia should immediately be made tougher in all areas. It would be far better and safer," he asserted, "to have a confrontation before Russia has a chance to restore and develop its colossal potential military, economic and territorial strength."¹³

Truman's Maneuvers

Carrying out these plans, however, was not such a simple matter. The abrupt deterioration of American-Soviet relations seriously disturbed broad segments of the American public and members of the cabinet, which still included, during this first phase of the new presidency, several people who had worked with Roosevelt. Future policy in relations with the Soviet Union was debated in the upper echelon of government. Feelings in favor of continued cooperation

with the USSR also prevailed in the mass media. Secretary of State J. Byrnes, who had been appointed by Truman to replace Stettinius, testifies that "by the end of the war the American people's desire to continue American-Soviet cooperation was so great that any attempt not to cooperate with the Russians would have aroused a great deal of disillusionment, if not indignation."¹⁴

A complex maneuver was undertaken soon afterward, and on three levels. First of all, the White House tried to stifle criticism by means of a verbal show of willingness to continue cooperating with the Soviet Union. The plan, however, was to offer Moscow obviously unacceptable terms. This led to the second level: blaming the Soviet Union for the cessation of the cooperation. The third level would entail the intense molding of public opinion for the cultivation of hostility toward the USSR.

One aspect of the plan misfired when Truman signed the order to stop lend-lease shipments to the Soviet Union on 8 May 1945. Not only was this done without any preliminary consultations with Moscow, but it was furthermore executed in the form of a challenge. The very next day, orders were issued to stop the loading of ships with equipment for the USSR in American ports, and ships en route to the USSR were ordered to turn around and return to the United States. Many American officials were shocked by this uncereceremonious act, representing an attempt to exert unconcealed pressure on Moscow. The President was earnestly advised to countermand this order, and he eventually took this advice. But Soviet-American relations had already been damaged, and this fact was naturally recognized in Moscow.

There is evidence to refute Truman's later comment that he signed the order to stop the lend-lease shipments without reading the document and without realizing its full meaning. The papers of J. Grew include a record of his telephone conversation with L. Crowley, the official then in charge of foreign economic relations. It indicates that Truman was well informed about all of this. Crowley told Grew that he had explained the essence of the matter to Truman. "I wanted," Crowley said, "the President to have a clear understanding of the situation and to support us (in the decision to stop shipments to the Soviet Union--V. B.) and leave the others out of this matter."¹⁵

In light of this, Truman's statements about the need to maintain "good relations" with the USSR naturally arouse suspicion. This was when the idea of sending Harry Hopkins to Moscow in May 1945 arose. Hopkins himself probably did not know Washington's true intentions, although he did talk with Truman before his departure. In spite of his serious health problems, Hopkins agreed to return to the capital of the USSR because he hoped that the rapid deterioration of relations between the two powers could still be corrected. The master of the White House was understandably happy about Hopkins' appointment. Hopkins was trusted in the Soviet Union: People in Moscow remembered that it was he who had been sent to the capital of the USSR in the difficult days of July 1941 and had become convinced of the Soviet people's fortitude. Besides this, Hopkins was a firm believer in the unity of the great powers. He could talk about the importance and necessity of continuing Roosevelt's policy without sounding like a hypocrite. His stay

in Moscow, from 25 May to 6 June 1945, is described in detail in Henry Adams' book and in a collection of documents published in Moscow in 1984.¹⁶

In general, the visit could have served as the point of departure for the resumption of constructive relations between the USSR and the United States. Summing up the results of the talk in the Kremlin, Hopkins concluded that the future positive development of Soviet-American relations was completely possible.

The media predicted that Hopkins would receive a high-level position in the new administration after this mission and might even become Truman's personal adviser. But the situation changed radically. In the 2 months since Roosevelt's death, people of a completely different type had made their appearance in the new administration. Hopkins' services were no longer needed. He had done his job: His trip to Moscow had conveyed the impression that Washington was trying to continue Roosevelt's policy. This gave the new chief executive a free hand for the unimpeded development of a "hard" line in relations with the Soviet Union. This is the kind of baggage Truman took with him to Berlin!

As for Churchill, he had already turned full circle long ago. Throughout May and June 1945 he urged Truman to hurry with a new conference of the "big three": Time, the British prime minister said, was on the USSR's side. Churchill also tried to urge the President not to give back the Soviet side the territories the Americans had seized in Germany after they had crossed the line of the Soviet occupation zone and advanced almost 200 kilometers into the zone.

Churchill argued that the removal of American troops from this territory would let the Red Army advance even farther into Germany. This, the prime minister wrote to Truman, would be an event describable as the "saddest in history." Churchill asserted that the Allied troops should not withdraw "until we receive satisfaction with regard to Poland and with regard to the temporary status of the Russian occupation of Germany."¹⁷

Washington, however, took a more cautious position. Churchill's proposal was rejected in the fear that it would undermine the agreement on the occupation zones in Germany and would have far-reaching consequences, particularly with regard to the USSR's involvement in the war in the Far East.

Before the Meeting

By the start of the Potsdam conference, many of the Allies' jointly adopted decisions had been implemented, confirming the possibility of productive cooperation by states with differing social systems even in peacetime. On 5 June 1945 the first meeting of the control council was held in Berlin. The next day, a declaration was published to announce Germany's defeat and the assumption of supreme power in Germany by the governments of the USSR, United States, Great Britain and France. The declaration said that the Allies would take such measures, "including the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, they deem necessary for future peace and security."¹⁸ The

occupying powers simultaneously published a brief account of their agreements on the occupation zones and on the line of command in Germany. In spite of Churchill's intrigues, it was agreed that the governments of the United States and England would remove their troops from the Soviet occupation zone. Since Berlin was the location of the control council and other organs of Allied control in Germany, military units of the Western powers would be permitted in specific sectors of greater Berlin. Nevertheless, Berlin would remain part of the Soviet occupation zone in Germany.

Questions concerning the deployment of troops among zones in Austria and the stationing of English, American and French troops in Vienna were settled soon afterward. The question of establishing a Provisional Polish Government of National Unity was also settled quickly. It was formed on 28 June 1945. The Provisional Government of the Polish Republic, previously recognized by the Soviet Union, remained its nucleus. The new government was recognized by France on 29 June and by the United States and England on 5 July.

On 26 June the conference in San Francisco ended successfully. The unanimous approval of the UN Charter proved that the world community supported the principle of the unity of the great powers and approved the organization's chief aim of delivering future generations from the horrors of world war.

All of this objectively created a favorable atmosphere for the resolution of matters on the Berlin conference agenda. The most important were questions connected with Germany's unconditional surrender. The political and economic principles of coordinated Allied policy had to be elaborated in accordance with the Yalta agreement. Then a decision had to be made on peace treaties for Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. Conference participants also had to settle matters connected with the establishment of the provisional Polish government and the dissolution of the Polish government-in-exile in London and to determine Poland's western border. Finally, the three Allied powers had to coordinate their actions against militarist Japan.

The Soviet Government had received reports that large German military units still existed in the western occupation zones and in other places, especially Norway. In spite of the decisions reached by the Allies, they had not been disarmed. The Soviet side felt it was important to learn the reasons for this. Other matters also had to be investigated at the conference.

Conference Decisions

When the reconstruction of Germany was being discussed, conference participants relied on the recommendations of the European Consultative Commission created by a decision of the Moscow conference of foreign ministers in 1943 and on the documents of the Tehran and Yalta conferences. Nevertheless, there were some difficulties. By that time the Western upper echelon had decided to try to use Germany's human and economic potential for anti-Soviet purposes. The statutes on the complete demilitarization and democratization of Germany no longer satisfied Washington and London politicians. The Soviet delegation had to fight a resolute battle for the observance of earlier agreements. This was a battle for Europe's security and also for the peaceful future of Germany and the real national interests of the German people.

The Soviet side suggested the creation of a central German administration made up of ministers of foreign trade, industry, finance, transportation and communications. The Western powers rejected this proposal. The result was a declaration recognizing the expediency of creating some important central German administrative departments in these areas under the supervision of the Allied control council. However, the document went on to say, "no central German government will be established" yet.¹⁹

The Potsdam conference agreement on the guiding political and economic principles of German administration during the initial period of control stated the following aims: the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the liquidation or control of all German industry capable of being used for military production; the eradication of the National Socialist Party and the prevention of Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda; the repeal of all Nazi laws; the punishment of war criminals; the encouragement of anti-fascist party activity and preparations for the complete reconstruction of Germany politics on a democratic basis and eventual peaceful cooperation by Germany in international affairs.

The economic principles adopted at the conference also had the aim of eliminating militarism, eradicating German military potential and precluding the start of a new war by Germany. The document drawn up by the participants in the Potsdam conference stressed that "during the period of occupation, Germany should be viewed as a single economic entity."²⁰ It envisaged a common Allied policy on the production and distribution of the products of the mining and processing industries; agriculture, forestry and the fishing industry; wages and prices; the import and export program and the monetary and banking system; reparations and the eradication of military-industrial potential; transportation and communication.

The issue of reparations was regarded as an element of the economic policy of the Allied powers. Reparations were supposed to serve the aims of the economic disarmament of Germany and simultaneously be a means of at least partially covering the damages suffered by invaded and occupied countries. An agreement concluded at the Crimean conference stipulated that Germany would have to pay in kind for the losses it inflicted on Allied nations during the war. The United States agreed with the Soviet proposal setting the sum of 20 billion dollars, half of which would be paid to the Soviet Union, as a basis for discussion. At the Potsdam conference, however, the American delegation reconsidered its position and opposed the setting of specific sums, suggesting that reparations be collected by zones. This clearly revealed a tendency hostile to the USSR: the reluctance to satisfy the Soviet Union's legitimate demands for reparations.

The question of reparations was finally settled after prolonged and heated discussions. The final agreement stipulated that Germany would compensate as far as possible for the injuries it had inflicted. The agreement specified that the USSR's reparation claims would be satisfied by means of confiscations from the Soviet occupation zone and from certain German overseas possessions. Besides this, it was decided that the Soviet Union should receive 25 percent of the industrial equipment confiscated in Western zones for reparation

purposes: 15 percent in exchange for an equivalent quantity of food, coal and other products, and 10 percent without pay or compensation of any kind. The Soviet side agreed to satisfy Poland's claims out of its own share.

Soon afterward, however, the Western powers stopped the reparation deliveries to the Soviet Union from their zones in an attempt to maintain Germany's military-economic potential for use against the USSR. This was the reason for the Western powers' reaction to the Soviet delegation's proposal that the Ruhr industrial region be transferred to the joint control of the United States, Great Britain, the USSR and France. Although Washington and London had previously suggested this kind of control, they now rejected the USSR's proposal.

Later, in spite of the Potsdam conference decisions envisaging the treatment of Germany as a "single economic entity," the Western powers used a separate monetary unit in their occupation zones, established "bizonal" and "trizonal" areas and thereby contributed to the birth of the FRG and to its inclusion in the anti-Soviet North Atlantic pact. This is what divided Europe into the two currently existing military and political groups. Those who have launched the loud propaganda campaign against the so-called "division of Europe" should not forget this.

When the punishment of the principal war criminals was discussed at the Potsdam conference, the Soviet delegation agreed with the English proposal that the main war criminals be given a "fair and speedy trial."²¹ It did suggest, however, that the main German war criminals be listed by name in a corresponding document, and this suggestion was eventually adopted in spite of the initial objections of American and English delegates.

The U.S. and English delegations reaffirmed their consent to transfer the city of Königsberg and the adjacent region to the USSR, a transfer which was agreed upon earlier, at the 1943 meeting in Tehran.

The Atom Bomb and Policy

When the Soviet delegation proposed that the question of Poland's western border be discussed in accordance with the decision of the Crimean conference, arguments arose. The Soviet plan, based on the wishes of the Polish government, proposed that the western border be established "west of Swinemünde to the Oder River with the city of Stettin remaining on the Polish side, and then upward along the Oder to the mouth of the western Neisse River and then along the western Neisse to the border of Czechoslovakia."²²

Delegates from the United States and England tried to avoid settling this matter. The debates grew heated. The stubbornness of the Western powers was compounded by a detailed report Truman had just received on the destructive force of the atomic bomb tested in New Mexico. The American President now realized the kind of lethal weapon the United States had. He decided to use this trump card. The information about the test, Margaret Truman wrote, "gave my father a chance to negotiate more boldly and resolutely."²³ American diplomat Robert Murphy expresses the same opinion: "When Truman chaired the fourth plenary session, we noticed a definite change in the President's

behavior. He seemed much more self-confident and much more inclined to take an active part in the discussion and to argue with some of Stalin's statements. It was obvious that something had happened."²⁴

It was then that Truman objected to the transfer of the old western Polish territories to Poland. He said that he could not consent to the proposed western Polish border "because there will be another place for this, namely a peace conference."²⁵ In other words, the American delegation tried to leave the matter unsettled, as Truman already believed that there would be no peace conference in the foreseeable future.

The Soviet side announced that this position was contrary to existing agreements. The decisions of the Yalta conference, I. V. Stalin remarked, said that "Poland must receive substantial additions to its territory in the north and the west. They go on to say that they, the three governments, believe that the opinions of the new Polish Government of National Unity should be solicited with regard to the size of these additions at the proper time and that the final delineation of Poland's western border will then be postponed until the peace conference."²⁶

Since the Provisional Polish Government established in Warsaw had already been recognized by all three great powers, there was no reason that the conference participants should not express their views on the Polish Government's wishes regarding the western border. The United States, however, continued to avoid discussions of this matter. After Truman informed Stalin on 24 July that the United States had built a weapon of "extraordinary destructive force," the Americans decided to exert pressure on the USSR again, hoping that the news about their atomic bomb would force the Soviet delegation to make concessions. The Soviet representatives behaved calmly and firmly, however, as if nothing had happened. They continued to support the just demands of the Poles. The first attempt at atomic blackmail in history failed.

The Soviet Union insisted that representatives of the Provisional Polish Government of National Unity should be invited to Potsdam. During a meeting with the heads of government and foreign ministers of the three powers, they thoroughly substantiated their demands for the originally Polish lands in the West. The Soviet delegation supported these demands.

After lengthy debates, the American and English delegations consented to establish the western border of Poland in accordance with the Soviet delegation's proposal. Therefore, the matter was completely settled at the Berlin conference.

The position taken by the Western powers was directly related to their far-reaching goals. Realizing that they would be unable to use Poland, as they had planned, as the main link of an anti-Soviet "cordon sanitaire," politicians in Washington and London tried to make the Polish state, which was friendly toward the Soviet Union, as weak as possible. In addition, they hoped to turn Germany, or at least its western half, into a bridgehead against the USSR. For this reason, they moved on from their previous plans for the partition of Germany to a new line. This is the reason for the attempt to

stop the transfer of lands to Poland, even though fundamental agreements had been reached on the matter in Tehran and Yalta.

The decision not to complicate the confrontation over Poland and to eventually reach an agreement, on the other hand, was connected with the U.S. interest in the quickest possible involvement of the USSR in the war in the Far East. The common Western opinion that Washington already saw no need for Soviet participation in the war against Japan by the time of the Potsdam meeting is inconsistent with the facts. Some of President Truman's private letters, which were declassified in 1983, testify that when he was in Berlin he still regarded a firm Soviet promise on this score as his chief aim. On 18 July 1945 the President wrote to his wife: "I got what I came here for without any trouble--Stalin will go to war.... Now it is probable that the war will be over a year earlier, and I am thinking about the boys who will not be killed."²⁷

The appearance of the atomic bomb fueled the American temptation to show the weapon to the entire world as soon as possible. At that time, however, no one knew about the effectiveness of an atomic bomb on the battlefield. American researcher Gabriel Kolko says in his book "The Politics of War": "We must remember that the Americans never regarded the bomb as a weapon which could defeat the powerful Japanese Army in China. However, they never regarded the possibility of a Soviet invasion of the islands of Japan as undesirable. The bomb did not diminish the importance of the Soviet advance in Manchuria and northern China because the Chinese would certainly have been incapable of liquidating the Japanese Army there even after the United States had destroyed Japan itself."²⁸

Truman's position was certainly ambiguous: On the one hand, he wanted to gain Moscow's firm consent to an invasion against Japan, but on the other he hoped that the atom bomb would force Japan to surrender quickly. In any case, Washington did not want Soviet troops to participate in the occupation of the Japanese islands.

There were lengthy and heated debates at the conference over the treatment of the liberated European countries which had fought on Hitler's side at the wish of their reactionary rulers but had then broken off relations with Germany and declared war on it. Soviet representatives criticized the dual approach of the Western powers toward, on the one hand, Italy and, on the other, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. They tried in every way to make things easier for Italy but were tough on the other states. The Soviet delegation had to fight a persistent battle to defend the principled and just position. The result was an agreement on "peace treaties and membership in the United Nations." It stipulated the obligation of the three powers to put an end to the anomalous status of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Romania by concluding peace treaties. By a decision of the conference, the treaties were to be drafted by the Council of Foreign Ministers. The three powers pledged to support the requests of the acknowledged democratic governments for UN membership after the treaties had been signed.

Through the efforts of the Soviet Union, decisions were made to secure favorable conditions for the development of the victorious people's democratic

order in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania and to strengthen their international position. The Soviet delegation consistently defended the independence of other liberated peoples as well and opposed U.S. and English attempts to interfere in their internal affairs.

In general, in spite of all the difficulties marking these talks, the Berlin conference resulted in important decisions on several specific problems, decisions which were approved and supported by other states. The conference resulted in coordinated decisions on postwar matters, reflecting the results of the popular antifascist liberation struggle. These decisions envisaged the most important undertakings for the demilitarization, democratization and de-Nazification of Germany and the establishment of conditions to exclude the danger of new aggression from the German land. The borders of European states were defined and the bases for the peaceful development of Europe were laid.

The Berlin (Potsdam) conference was of special historical importance because it again demonstrated the possibility of successful cooperation by states with differing social orders, and not only in warfare but in the organization of the postwar world as well. It also demonstrated the utter futility of power politics in relations with the Soviet Union and the need to seek and find mutually acceptable solutions to the urgent problems of the day.

The United States Rejects the Principle of Cooperation

In the West, the 40th anniversary of the Potsdam conference served as the latest occasion for a propaganda campaign to cast suspicion on the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union. It has been alleged that Moscow departed from the principle of cooperation with the Western powers as soon as the war had ended and chose the line of confrontation with Washington. This is how Paul Nitze describes postwar developments in an article in FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Turning the facts inside-out, he asserts that after World War II the United States and its allies believed that "peace was the norm, that the international order should be based on a balance and that war was potentially so destructive that it was actually unacceptable." However, Nitze goes on to say, by spring 1946 the Soviet Union had "denied the unacceptability of war and declared that the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the struggle for peace applied to the distant future and that the United States should be regarded as the center of the opposing capitalist world, the existence of which makes real peace impossible."²⁹

In this quotation, Nitze puts the word "peace" in italics in connection with his own, extremely original interpretation of the "Soviet understanding" of the struggle for peace. After stating that changes in the Russian alphabet after the revolution had led to a situation in which the Russian word "mir," meaning the absence of war, was spelled in the same way as "mir," meaning the earth, Nitze asserts that the Soviet idea of struggle for peace should be read as the struggle for "world power." This, he says in summation, is the reason for all of the postwar problems.

In the United States, Ambassador Nitze is considered to be a prominent expert on arms control, but he has obviously taken on a job beyond his capabilities

in his interpretation of Russian spelling rules and vocabulary. Any school-child would laugh at his mental exercises. For this reason, there is no need to dwell on them. But as far as the USSR's postwar position is concerned, here the experienced diplomat should have adhered to the facts. They testify conclusively that the USSR has always pursued a line of peaceful coexistence by states with differing social systems. And the United States has opposed this. The incident discussed previously in this article testifies that Washington began to depart from Roosevelt's policy of cooperation with the USSR as soon as Truman entered the White House. The line of diktat was chosen and was reinforced by the hope that the Americans would soon have an atom bomb. J. Byrnes informed President Truman in April 1945 that the atomic weapon "might be so powerful that it could be capable of wiping whole cities off the face of the earth and destroying their populations on an unprecedented scale." Furthermore, he expressed the belief that "the bomb could give us a marvelous opportunity to dictate our own terms at the end of the war."³⁰ This is who cherished the idea of controlling the world!

In his final speech at the Potsdam conference, President Truman said: "Until our next meeting, which, I hope, will be soon."³¹ But he had something else in mind. As J. Byrnes reports, when Truman was crossing the Atlantic on the "Augusta," which was taking the American delegation from a ravaged Europe to a flourishing America, which had already dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, he was speculating: "The Potsdam experiment made me decide that I will not allow the Russians to participate in any way in the control of Japan.... Force is the only thing the Russians understand." He then added that he had "firmly resolved never again to attend any such meeting in person."³²

Therefore, it is obvious that people in the United States were certainly not thinking about the "balance" mentioned in P. Nitze's moving description. They were thinking of how the power of the atomic bomb might be used against the Soviet Union.

American politicians were then certain that they would keep their monopoly on atomic weapons for a long time. In the opinion of some scientists who worked on the bomb, the USSR would not have the secret for at least 7-10 years. And military experts made even more encouraging estimates, stating that the Soviet Union would need at least 20 years to do this.³³

"No one was too upset by the prospect because it seemed obvious that we should move far ahead of the Soviets in this field in the next 7 years," Byrnes wrote. The U.S. secretary of state arrived at far-reaching conclusions: "At first we had only a small switch, and not a big stick.... As our military strength grows, we can display our firmness in relations with the Soviet Government."³⁴

The diplomats who were also coming home on the "Augusta" shared these views. Charles Bohlen recalls that the American delegation had lively discussions about future U.S. foreign policy: "We acknowledged the possibility of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.... We spoke of the atom bomb and of how the feelings of security and strength it gave us might be used in our relations with the Soviet Union. We realized that the Soviet Union would respond to nothing but measures capable of endangering its country or its

system. We considered the measures that might be taken, from a direct ultimatum to the demand that the Soviets stay within their borders."³⁵

These ideas then took the form of a belligerent anti-Soviet policy line. When a session of the Council of Foreign Ministers was held in London in September 1945 in accordance with the Potsdam decisions, the Western powers had completed their reversal. At this session the United States and England tried to use the peace talks for overt interference in the internal affairs of popular democratic countries. It was the aim of American policy to overthrow the legal governments of these states. The Soviet Union did not allow this interference. Washington then undermined the work of the London session, using purely procedural matters as an excuse.

It was at this time that Washington's intention to use the atomic monopoly to intimidate and blackmail the Soviet Union became completely evident. At one reception in the House of Lords, Secretary of State Byrnes mentioned that he was from South Carolina and then delivered this crude tirade to the Soviet foreign minister: "You do not know southerners. We carry guns in our hip pockets. If you do not stop all of these maneuvers and get down to business, I will pull out my atomic bomb and introduce you to it."³⁶

This is the kind of postwar order Washington politicians wanted.

John Foster Dulles, who attended the London session as a representative of the Republicans, described the prevailing atmosphere: "At that moment our postwar policy was born: no pacification" (that is, no cooperation with the USSR--V. B.). "In general," Dulles continued, "we have invariably adhered to it.... Our actions at the meeting in London had important implications: They marked the end of an entire era--the era of Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam."³⁷

This was how matters really stood. Washington, and not Moscow, is to blame for the abandonment of cooperation.

The recent attempts to denigrate the Potsdam decisions and misrepresent the causes of the "cold war" are aimed against the idea of peaceful coexistence by states with differing social structures. They are also aimed at the revision of the results of World War II. It is no coincidence that all types of revanchists have joined this campaign after receiving special encouragement when President Reagan visited the Bitburg cemetery, where SS men are buried alongside Wehrmacht soldiers.

As for the Soviet Union, it wants to maintain normal, and even friendly, relations with the Western powers. "The Soviet Government tried to make the peace, won at such a high cost, truly lasting. It tried to maintain close cooperation with all the Allies--the United States, England and France--and settle postwar matters in close contact with them."³⁸

Our country, firmly adhering to Lenin's policy of peace and peaceful coexistence, is always prepared to respond to goodwill with goodwill and to trust with trust. There is nothing unavoidable about the constant confrontation between the USSR and the United States. The Soviet Union is willing to participate in the continued establishment of peaceful and mutually beneficial

cooperation between states on the basis of equality, mutual respect and non-intervention in internal affairs. These principles were reaffirmed in the Helsinki declaration.

On the 40th anniversary of the Potsdam conference, it is important to re-emphasize the significance of this experience, which demonstrated the possibility of the conclusion of agreements by states with differing social systems with the observance of equality, equivalent security and mutual respect for the legal interests of all sides.

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IN THE INTERESTS OF STRONGER SOVIET-CANADIAN MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 85 (signed to press 17 Jun 85) pp 65-67

[Article by N. B. Bantsekin]

[Text] Exchanges of visits by statesmen improve relations between states. The Soviet visit of Canadian Foreign Secretary J. Clark in April 1985 should be viewed in this light.

Canada and the Soviet Union have accumulated considerable experience in the development of relations in the spirit of neighborly mutual understanding and cooperation. Their establishment at the beginning of the 1970's and subsequent reinforcement required the Canadian leadership to display a certain degree of political determination to overcome the inertia of the "cold war" and resist the opponents of friendly relations between our countries inside and outside Canada. As a result of the 1971 talks between Prime Minister P. Trudeau of Canada and Chairman A. N. Kosygin of the USSR Council of Ministers and other statesmen from our countries, a foundation of legal agreements was laid for our interrelations and several documents were signed to specify the main areas of the development of contacts between the two states. They include the agreement on cooperation in the use of scientific and technical achievements in industry, the protocol on consultations and the general agreement on exchanges.

The continued reinforcement of mutually beneficial contacts was promoted by the 1976 long-term agreement on economic, industrial, scientific and technical cooperation and the 1978 long-range program of economic, industrial, scientific and technical cooperation. The 1981 intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in agriculture was of great value in the development of Soviet-Canadian contacts in agriculture.

Soviet-Canadian relations have been stable in general and have quite successfully stood the test of time. Through the efforts of both sides, an adequate foundation was laid and positive experience was accumulated for the continued constructive development of contacts between the USSR and Canada in all areas.

High-level contacts are of special importance in the reinforcement of trust and mutual understanding between the USSR and Canada and are an important way

of maintaining the Soviet-Canadian political dialogue on matters of mutual interest in bilateral relations and world politics.

The May 1983 Canadian visit of M. S. Gorbachev as the head of a delegation from the USSR Supreme Soviet marked an important phase in the development of Soviet-Canadian relations.

Soviet and Canadian foreign ministers meet and talk almost each year at various international forums (sessions of the UN General Assembly and the Stockholm Conference).

General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev's talk with Canadian Prime Minister B. Mulroney in Moscow in March 1985 showed that both sides want to invest their mutual relations with specific meaning.

The April talks of the Soviet and Canadian foreign ministers in Moscow were of great importance in this context. The central topic of discussion was international security. A. A. Gromyko stressed that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is aimed primarily at securing a definite change for the better in the development of international events. Keeping the peace and curbing the arms race, especially the nuclear race, are the most important goals of this policy. The USSR has taken the same position at the Soviet-American Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons. The Soviet side noted that current objectives--the prevention of the militarization of outer space, the cessation of the arms race on earth and the radical reduction of nuclear weapons--can only be attained if the United States makes reciprocal moves. Clark's attention was directed to the Soviet Union's major initiative to improve the international climate and revive detente. A responsible and constructive approach on the part of the West could contribute a great deal to the radical improvement of the world situation.

Clark expressed Canada's interest in relaxing international tension and eliminating the danger of nuclear war. In connection with this, the Canadian Government, he said, has great hopes for the Soviet-American Geneva talks and will take action in the hope of making them productive.

Of course, it would be naive to assume that the positions of the Soviet Union and Canada on major international issues always coincide. The two countries belong to opposite social systems and different military-political groups. For this reason, their views on major international issues often diverge considerably. Canadian politicians must realize, however, that the arms race has already surpassed all reasonable limits and that ways of stopping it must be found. "Our differences of opinion," J. Clark said at a breakfast given in his honor by A. A. Gromyko on 3 April in Moscow, "convince us that we must redouble our efforts to understand one another."

In addition to determining the range of these differences, the Canadian foreign secretary's visit resulted in a clearer understanding of the areas in which Canadian and Soviet views are similar to some degree. For example, both countries oppose the continued proliferation of nuclear weapons and favor a ban on chemical weapons and an all-encompassing political settlement in the Middle

East in accordance with UN resolutions. The participants in the Moscow talks expressed support for the efforts of the Contadora group to solve problems in Central America by political means with the strictest observance of the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states.

In the sphere of bilateral relations, a mutual desire for their consistent development was noted. The two sides confirmed their willingness to engage in more active political dialogue and broader mutually beneficial cooperation in various spheres and to invest this cooperation with specific content. In particular, the spheres where it might be most productive were defined. For example, Canada has expressed great interest in bilateral cooperation in the study and exploration of the Arctic and the north. Joint efforts to solve problems in agricultural production also seem quite promising. Broader Canadian-Soviet trade, the exchange of manufactured goods and of modern industrial and agricultural technology, could be of considerable mutual benefit. And there is no question that stronger friendly relations will necessitate the resumption of official contacts in culture, science and technology on a regular basis.

Clark's visit to the USSR had another important result--it acquainted him with our country. The Canadian secretary visited Leningrad, Novosibirsk and Kiev in addition to Moscow and met private citizens of our country as well as politicians and statesmen. According to the reports of the Canadian journalists accompanying J. Clark, his trip made a great impression on him, particularly the frankness, sincerity and conviction with which the Soviet people support the foreign policy of their state and the passion with which they speak out against the arms race and the danger of nuclear war. The meeting in Kiev near the Eternal Flame, where the Canadian foreign secretary laid a wreath, also impressed him greatly. It might have been at that moment that he understood the real feelings of the Soviet people, expressed in A. A. Gromyko's speech at the breakfast honoring J. Clark: "The 40th anniversary of the great victory over our common enemy, Hitler's fascism, is forcing us all to seriously consider whether or not every effort has been made to prevent a new war with its horrifying implications."

The visit to the USSR gave the Canadian foreign secretary a chance to become convinced of the Soviet people's sincere desire for peace and their friendly feelings for the Canadian people. The talks in Moscow established good prerequisites for the further development of Canadian-Soviet relations.

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U.S. PROBLEMS WITH COMPUTER CRIME

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 85 (signed to press 17 Jun 85) pp 71-74

[Article by A. A. Kuteynikov: "Computer Break-Ins"]

[Text] The following incident, which was thoroughly covered by the American press, took place in the city of Milwaukee.

A group of young people between the ages of 16 and 25 were able to acquire access to the memory of computers established in industrial firms, universities and even government agencies of the United States and Canada, causing a great deal of chaos. They got the idea from the popular film "WarGames," the plot of which was quite simple: A teenager who thinks he is playing an ordinary electronic game dealing with World War III accidentally breaks into the computer of the U.S. Defense Department with his home computer and causes it to react to the start of a nuclear conflict.

Computer break-ins of this type have been the subject of many movies and TV shows, and these have simultaneously provided technical instructions on how to break computer codes. This has given birth to a new type of crime. This is one of the unexpected results of the establishment of the American information infrastructure, which has turned into a broad network of data banks connected by large and small computers.

The scales of this infrastructure can be judged from the fact that by 1984 there were already 56,500 large computers operating in U.S. government establishments and private corporations and there were over 35 million personal computers, according to some estimates, around 15 million of which were being used in government and private organizations while the other 20 million belonged to the category of "home computers." Within the framework of this system, computers of various types can exchange information, and this is what provided extensive opportunities for computer sabotage and crimes.

All of them can be divided into three groups: irresponsible games bordering on hooliganism; the use of computers for personal gain; industrial espionage. Besides this, there is a broad range of computer abuses, such as the unauthorized use of machine time, although these are not categorized as crimes.

Irresponsible Games

Young people are usually involved in this activity. The adolescents who play these games erase whole blocks of data from the memory of their "victim" or rearrange the data, and they then sign their crimes with distinctive epithets, such as "Johnny was here" or "Vampire and Phantom." Sometimes they add obscene phrases. This new form of self-assertion is being practiced by some young people with the aid of modern technology.

Games of this kind sometimes lead to crimes when they involve hospital or airport computers. This kind of "mischief" can kill people.

Computer Theft

This is generally committed not by raw youths but by mature professionals with programming and accounting expertise. The thief is frequently a person who acquires the secret computer code by accident or who discovers loopholes in the electronic security system designed to block the access of unauthorized persons to the computer memory. It is usually an employee of the firm--from a petty clerk all the way to the president of the company.

The object of interest in these cases is information about commercial stocks (primarily products ready for shipping) and about monetary and credit operations. In the first case the wrongdoer instructs the computer to ship an item to a specific address and inserts false payment data in its memory. The item is resold, and the money paid for it is then pocketed by the thief. This was the method used by, for example, 18-year-old student J. Schneider, who stole over a million dollars' worth of spare parts from the Pacific Telephone Company and resold them through his own firm. The majority of criminals, however, prefer to receive cash directly, without taking the trouble to resell stolen goods. Money from bank accounts or large corporations is transferred through several intermediate bank accounts to the account of the computer manipulator. One incident which created quite a stir occurred in 1979, when former college professor S. Rifkin stole money from a California bank where he was working as a computer consultant. The funds totaled 10.2 million dollars. In 1980 Wells Fargo Bank in San Francisco was the victim of group theft: 21.3 million dollars disappeared from its vaults. The incidence of computer theft in the United States is rising quickly because opening safes with a computer is much more profitable than armed robbery.

The new form of theft aroused the interest of organized crime. The Mafia threatens and blackmails the employees of banks and corporations for computer codes. In this way, computer crime has acquired the dimensions characteristic of large gangster organizations.

Industrial Espionage

This is the form of computer break-in least likely to be discovered or recorded. In this case the criminal does not work for a gangster syndicate but for a respectable industrial or other corporation striving to copy the information entered into a computer by a rival without changing it. In these cases it is extremely difficult to establish even the fact of the break-in.

The main types of information serving as the target of computer industrial espionage are the results of development projects, technological documentation, geological prospecting data, general commercial information, such as lists of suppliers and clients, and all types of firm secrets, down to the salaries of top executives and specialists. In one of the few discovered incidents of this type, an employee with access to information stored in the computer about ordered but unshipped products sold this information to the competition. With the aid of this information, the competing firm was able to offer the client similar products at a lower price and with an earlier delivery date.

There is no single set of computer crime statistics. Experts disagree in their estimates of the scales and dynamics of this phenomenon. At the beginning of the 1980's estimates of annual losses ranged from 300 million to 5 billion dollars, but even the lowest figure is more than 20 times as high as estimates for the beginning of the 1970's. Federal Attorney R. Giuliani believes that the amount of money stolen with the aid of computers from banks alone is four times as great as the amount stolen in armed robberies. Chairman W. Hughes of the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime (Democrat, New Jersey) cited the following data: Between 1980 and 1984 alone, the number of unauthorized break-ins rose by 500 percent.

The absence of statistics or of any kind of common estimates is primarily due to the extremely low rate of detection of this kind of crime. It is probable that only 10-11 percent of the perpetrators are brought to trial and the rate of conviction is even lower. Paradoxically, the main reason is the reluctance of victims to take these matters to court. In the fear of losing their good name, companies try to conceal cases of computer crime if their employees are implicated. Besides this, court trials of this kind require the services of many highly paid experts. This causes court costs to rise so dramatically that it is often more convenient to drop the matter.

Equally serious difficulties arise when penalties are being determined. The United States still does not have any standard federal legislation categorizing computer crime as a unique type of offense. Some states passed such laws at the beginning of the 1980's, but by 1984 fewer than 20 states had legally secured penalties for computer criminals. Some of the difficulties arising in their categorization stem from the fact that they cannot be viewed as cases of traditional theft or robbery because American laws presuppose the physical attainment of an item of value from the victim in both of these cases. But what happens when the object of the theft is information rather than an item of material value? Furthermore, in cases of industrial espionage the information in the robbed computer remains essentially untouched.

The growing scales of computer crime and the probability of its tragic implications, however, have motivated jurists to work on some kind of standard legislation for the entire United States. The need for a special law also stems from the fact that the criminal and the victim might be located in different states with different laws on computer crime.

The struggle against computer crime entails prevention as well as punishment. Some companies and banks have taken steps to tighten computer security. An

estimated 300 million dollars was spent for this purpose in 1982. Those who had to pay in the past for a lack of security have been particularly energetic in this area. For example, the bank robbed by Professor Rifkin, Security Pacific National Bank, spent 1.5 million dollars in 1983 to guarantee its computer security and employs a staff of 60 for this purpose. Specialized consulting firms have also been established to aid clients in the planning of computer security systems. One of the most widespread methods involves the use of an automatic digital device built directly into the computer. On the basis of a standard worked out by IBM, these digital devices encode all information with a special "key" consisting of 56 zeros and units. The information can be interpreted only by someone who knows the "key."

The development of computer crime has naturally aroused the interest of insurance companies as well. The first insurance for these crimes was offered in 1981 by the famous Lloyd's of London, and its example was immediately followed by leading American insurance firms. By 1983 insurance policies worth 20 million dollars had already been sold in the United States, and by 1986, according to WALL STREET JOURNAL's estimates, the figure will rise to 100 million. In connection with the substantial losses resulting from the average computer crime, the insurance premiums are also quite high--from 25,000 to 100,000 dollars a year.

The spread of computer break-ins also concerns the administration. In January 1981 a computer security center was established in the Pentagon to design, develop and operate systems for the protection of this department's computers. Besides this, the center advises other federal departments and agencies on these matters. The FBI has also reacted to the activities of computer saboteurs: Around 500 agents have taken special crime detection and investigation courses in the first half of the 1980's.

Experts believe that it is unlikely that effective technical means of protecting computers against such break-ins will be developed in the foreseeable future, particularly now that organized crime has expressed such a great interest in the new ways of obtaining illegal access. The combination of technical factors and the social conditions nurturing crime in the capitalist society led to the development of the new social phenomenon of computer crime in the United States.

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ARBATOV COMMENTS ON INTERVIEW WITH GENE LAROCQUE

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[Interview of Rear-Admiral (Ret) Gene R. Larocque, director of the Defense Information Center, by Doctor of Historical Sciences G. I. Svyatov in Moscow in April 1985, and comments on interview by G. A. Arbatov: "Gene Larocque: Peaceful Coexistence Is the Only Sane Alternative"]

[Text] In April 1985 a scientific conference was held in Moscow on the 40th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Retired Rear-Admiral Gene R. Larocque, now the director of the Defense Information Center, was invited to the conference as an active participant in the war against fascist Germany and imperialist Japan. He founded the center, an independent research establishment, in Washington in 1972 for the objective analysis of U.S. military policy and U.S.-Soviet arms limitation. Larocque is famous inside and outside the United States as an active supporter of arms limitation, the reduction of the danger of war and the normalization of American-Soviet relations. Not all of the conclusions of his works and of the studies of the center he heads are indisputable; many are objectionable. But the overall import of the admiral's statements during congressional hearings, on radio and television and at various symposiums, conferences and meetings indisputably reflects the realities of the nuclear age, including the main one: War is impermissible, and efforts to guarantee security by means of an arms race are impermissible. The center he heads periodically issues the *DEFENSE MONITOR* bulletin and other publications, in which matters of military policy are examined in a highly professional manner.

Doctor of Historical Sciences G. I. Svyatov interviewed Admiral Larocque at the editors' request.

Question: How do you feel about the Soviet decision to impose a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles and to stop taking other countermeasures in Europe?

Answer: It seems to me that we cannot expect a particularly enthusiastic response to this from the White House and State Department. In the United States there are too many who are interested in arms buildup rather than reduction.

I think that the Soviet Government's decision to put a freeze on the deployment of SS-20 missiles and to stop taking other countermeasures in Europe can be called a positive move, confirming the Soviet Union's serious approach to the issue of arms control. If the United States were to take a similar step by putting a freeze on the deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe, this could change the entire situation for the better. But I do not think that we will see this kind of reaction from the U.S. Government soon.

Question: How would you describe the current international situation in general and the role played in it by the United States and the USSR?

Answer: Of course, the international situation now, as always, is in a state of constant change, but there are a number of fundamental factors that seem to stay the same from year to year. One of them is the constant military and political rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. What they do and do not do influences the entire world, which keeps an anxious eye on the development of relations between these two powers. Positive development is followed by a tendency toward lower tension throughout the world. Unfortunately, there are many areas in which the relations between our countries are in the nature of confrontations. One is Central America, and especially Nicaragua. There is also some concern in the United States about the situation in Afghanistan. The United States uses its influence and pressures its West European allies in an effort to impede the development of their commercial relations with the Soviet Union.

In general, I think it can be said that there are people in the United States, especially in the White House, who believe that pressuring the USSR could force it to act according to Washington's wishes in international affairs. I strongly doubt that this method will help us reach any kind of agreement on arms limitation in Geneva. But I am pleased that representatives of the United States and Soviet Union have met there, because there is at least a possibility of positive results when we sit down and negotiate face to face.

Question: What can you say about the problem of limiting and reducing strategic offensive arms and medium-range nuclear weapons?

Answer: I have decided that it would probably be impossible to stop arms production in the United States. There are several reasons. The American defense industry is getting stronger all the time and will not allow this. The stronger the military corporations become, the more funds they receive, and the more money they have, the better their chances are of receiving new appropriations from Congress. As a result, U.S. military expenditures are rising dramatically and could go completely out of control. Soon even the President of the United States might not be able to put a stop to new weapon systems, especially those already in the production stage.

In my opinion, some improvement can nevertheless be made in Soviet-American relations, especially since arms in themselves are not the real problem, but only one of its symptoms. The problem we are actually facing is the problem of the fear, mistrust and suspicion characteristic of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, phenomena engendered largely by uninformed and incorrect ideas about the USSR. But more weapons do not guarantee more security for Americans. An increase in arms production provokes a similar response in the Soviet Union. The appearance of almost each new weapon system has been followed by the development of the same system in the USSR, as in the case of the atom bomb and other weapons. Both sides already have so many nuclear warheads that they can destroy each other several times over.

Question: What do you think of the so-called new American "strategic defense initiative," commonly called "star wars"?

Answer: The idea of "star wars," envisaging the development and deployment of defensive strategic weapon systems, appeals to the American public because it creates the illusion that some kind of defense against nuclear weapons can be created if enough money is spent. But this is not true. It is impossible to create a system of guaranteed defense against the great variety of nuclear delivery means the Soviet Union has today and might develop in the future. It will always be possible to surmount any defensive system by deploying additional offensive systems or by creating false targets and electronic means of counteraction.

It must be said that many Americans share the maximalist belief in the defense miracle, even though they realize that it is essentially impossible to create this kind of system. And it is this very impossibility that is the strongest motive for theories creating the illusion of possible defense. From the psychological standpoint this is understandable, but from the military standpoint it is impracticable.

Question: What can you say about the U.S. view of Soviet strategic nuclear arms?

Answer: I would like to say that fear is not aroused by the strategic arms themselves. Otherwise, we should be afraid of the strategic nuclear arms of Great Britain or France. Ten years ago we were afraid of Chinese nuclear arms, but today we are not, because our view of China has changed. Whereas we once spoke of the "Soviet-Chinese threat," now we speak only of the "Soviet threat."

As for me, I do not think that the "Soviet military threat" is real. The Soviet Union is capable of destroying us, but so is Mrs. Thatcher. The threat exists in our minds. In the political context, the "Soviet threat" is mentioned in the hope of obtaining funds. But if the matter is examined from the military standpoint, the discussion can only concern the military potential to destroy us. We must be consistent: Even if the USSR is capable of destroying the United States, we must wonder why it would want to do this.

The Soviet Union has nothing to gain from a nuclear attack on the United States. I believe that it might decide to attack the United States only in a situation in which it is convinced that we are attacking it and that the attack will occur within a few minutes. This is the only possibility. For this reason, we must never cause the Soviet Union to expect a nuclear attack. It is particularly important to take joint action to prevent the accidental, unauthorized or provocative start of a nuclear war between the United States and the USSR.

Question: How do you feel about total and universal nuclear disarmament?

Answer: Extremely positive over the long range. In the near future, however, we must learn to live with nuclear weapons--otherwise, we will have to die from them. And even if we agree to destroy nuclear weapons and we do destroy them, the knowledge and the material and technical facilities for their production will still exist.

Einstein once said that the discovery of atomic energy had changed everything but our way of thinking. Einstein was right, but only by half. It seems to me that it is not enough to change only our way of thinking. We must change our way of behaving in situations of grave nuclear danger, when the entire world could be destroyed within a few minutes. We must think and act appropriately. But we are still behaving essentially as if there were no nuclear weapons, as if we could still fight a war--with conventional weapons alone. This is a serious mistake. No side can win a war between the United States and the USSR. Only mutual assured destruction is possible. For this reason, the only sane alternative in the development of American-Soviet relations is the firm intention to prevent nuclear war, peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial commercial, technological and cultural cooperation between the USSR and United States.

Comments on Interview by G. A. Arbatov

I have the deepest respect for Admiral Larocque's views. Even when I do not agree with them. And this is precisely why I felt it was important to comment on some of his statements.

I have already had an opportunity, during discussions we both attended, to dispute the admiral's opinion that nothing can be done about the arms race, that it will be with us forever. And my arguments have not only been motivated by moral considerations or by the reluctance to accept the fact that the arms race is an inevitability, as they say, from now on and forevermore.

There are economic limits to this process, because the arms race implies the exponential growth of military expenditures--that is, growth to a point that even the economies of the richest countries, including the United States, will not survive.

There are also other limiting factors: The arms race itself is bringing us closer to the catastrophic verge of nuclear war. And for many reasons. One is that new weapon systems can completely undermine the process of arms

limitation both as a result of inconceivable difficulties in the control of arms limitation agreements and as a result of other factors. The second reason is that the arms race is objectively leading to a situation in which questions of war and peace will be decided more by machines than by men. Here is just one example: The Pershing II missile, designed expressly to destroy the other side's command, control and communication centers, reduces the decisionmaking period--and these are obviously the most important and most crucial decisions in human history--to 5-7 minutes. The third reason is that the political atmosphere cannot be improved at a time of arms race escalation.

Here I will move on to another argument against Admiral Larocque's statement. I do not agree that anything can be gained in the sphere of political relations and the strengthening of mutual trust under the conditions of a continuing and even intensifying arms race. I am certain that it is precisely the arms race that is the main source of mistrust in our relations, and therefore the main source of tension. After all, we have no territorial disputes or economic conflicts. As for ideological differences, it is my belief (based on the study of history and of the present state of affairs) that they certainly do not doom us to war, or even to irreconcilable hatred. But the arms race is a different matter. Since 1945 we have lived with the constant realization that nuclear weapons are being developed and American military strength is constantly being built up precisely against us (and not against anyone else). We have seen no other alternative but to counteract it with our own strength. I admit that this evoked a reaction from the Americans, but all of this simply confirms the central importance of the arms race in escalating tension and undermining international detente.

And there is something else. Admiral Larocque is correct in his remarks about the sinister role of the U.S. military-industrial complex, but this is also the root of several of the political problems he mentions. If resources and funds are to be diverted from important civilian programs and if Americans are to be forced to pay the bills, they must--and here I am using the words of the late Senator Vandenberg, who gave this advice to President Truman--be "scared to death." Larocque is right when he says that the nuclear weapons of Great Britain and France, and even those of China for some time now, represent no threat to the United States. But he does not say that the U.S. military-industrial complex has an organic need for some kind of "threat" to retain its profits and privileges, its influence and power. Even if there were no USSR, one would have to be invented....

And here we return to the starting point. The arms race, bad political relations and mistrust are organically related. They must be combated simultaneously.

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MATERIAL AND TECHNICAL FACILITIES FOR SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

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[Article by I. N. Trofimova]

[Text] The establishment of a material and technical base for science¹ is one of the most crucial aspects of its development and determines the productivity of scientific labor and the very possibility of conducting scientific research. The expansion and improvement of the material and technical base for science are now the main conditions for the acceleration of scientific and technical progress. With the aid of the proper financing, research in the most promising and advanced fields is stimulated. For this reason, budget financing of the material and technical base is the most effective instrument of state scientific and technical policy.

This article analyzes the present state of the material and technical base of American science and the most urgent problems in its development, connected primarily with progress in scientific instrument building.

Financing and Fixed Capital

The financing of the material and technical base of science includes expenditures on research materials (cell cultures, chemicals, special materials, etc.), on technical equipment for short- and long-term use and on the construction of buildings and facilities. Expenditures on research materials and scientific equipment with a short service life are generally low and are categorized as current expenses, whereas equipment for long-term use and construction costs are categorized as capital expenditures. Equipment for short-term use accounts for the highest percentage of purchases. According to data for a group of leading U.S. universities, for example, the ratio of capital expenditures to current expenditures on equipment in 1979 was 1:7.5.² The following discussion will concern capital investments in fixed capital in science, which determine the capital-labor ratio for researchers in this sphere.³ In contrast to investments in production, capital investments in the material and technical base of science are influenced little by cyclical economic changes. The dynamics of these investments are distinguished by lengthy periods of rise and decline. Statistics indicate a rise in the 1960's and a decline in the following decade (see table).

Capital Investments in U.S. Science in 1960's and 1970's,
decade averages, 1972 prices

Categories	Total investments***		Budget funds	
	\$ billions	%	\$ billions	%
1960's				
Total*	5.0	100	0.98	100
Government laboratories	0.6	12	0.6	61.2
Contracted centers	0.12	2.4	0.12	12.2
Universities and colleges	1.05	21	0.15	15
Industry**	3.1	61.6	0.1	10.4
1970's				
Total*	4.5	100	0.73	100
Government laboratories	0.29	6.4	0.29	39.7
Contracted centers	0.17	3.9	0.17	23.3
Universities and colleges	0.75	16.7	0.04	5
Industry	3.1	69.9	0.2	28.5

* Including estimates of capital investments in industry and non-profit organizations.

** Estimate based on data in RESEARCH MANAGEMENT, September 1980, pp 25-28.

*** Total includes data for non-profit organizations.

Calculated according to: "Science Indicators, 1980," Wash., 1981, pp 261, 246; "Federal Funds for Research and Development, 1979, 1980 and 1981," Wash., 1981; "Academic Science, 1972-1980," Wash., 1981, pp 46, 47.

The 1960's were a period of intensive basic research. The average annual rate of increase in expenditures in this field in 1960-1969 was 12.4 percent, as compared to 6.5 percent and 6.8 percent⁴ for applied research and development. Theoretical research and the material and technical base of scientific subdivisions conducting this kind of research (laboratories of higher academic institutions, federal labs and contracted centers) was developed actively in these years. The emphasis on the development of basic science was clearly reflected in government policy. Federal budget expenditures on this research increased by an average of 14.6 percent in the 1960's, as compared to 5.7 and 4.8 percent for applied research and development.

In the 1970's there was a general decline in the effectiveness of capital investments in science, just as in the production sphere, and a related absolute and relative decrease in volumes of capital investments and a change in their patterns. Annual capital investments in the material and technical base were 10 percent lower on the average than in the 1960's, and the proportion accounted for by these in total expenditures on science dropped from 17.3 percent to 14.9 percent, and in private capital investments from 4.7 to 3.4 percent (calculated in 1972 prices). Budget financing of the material and technical base increased from 19.7 percent of total capital expenditures

on science to 16.2 percent. There were also significant changes in scientific priorities and, consequently, in the structure of financing. The 1970's were distinguished by a lower percentage of expenditures on basic research and a higher percentage on applied research. The average annual rate of increase in expenditures on theoretical research was 8.2 percent in this decade, as compared to 8.9 and 8.5 percent for applied research and development. Similar changes in the relative rates of increase in expenditures on various types of research and development are recorded in federal budget indicators, reflecting a change in the priorities of state scientific policy.

As a result of changes in scientific priorities, the level of investments in the material and technical base of universities and colleges was 30 percent lower on the average in the 1970's than in the 1960's (in 1972 prices). Budget financing of this base fell to almost one-fourth of its previous level. The capital financing of federal laboratories was cut in half, but state budget expenditures on the material and technical base of the private sector doubled.

No serious changes in the distribution of financial resources were made in the early 1980's. Although the rate of increase in expenditures on basic research was higher than in the 1970's, it did not match the rate for applied R & D (10, 11 and 12 percent respectively in 1980-1984). In the federal budget this growth rate was lower--from 8.1 to 8.8 percent. Budget-funded investments in science rose only 5 percent between 1980 and 1984, and they decreased some years. This was a result of the austerity program Reagan proposed as part of his economic policy. For example, the program led to the cancellation of financial allocations for the National Science Foundation (NSF) in 1982 for the modernization of university lab equipment and the purchase of costly equipment for individual university researchers. The NSF is the only federal agency whose main function is the stimulation of basic research.

When the draft NSF budget for 1984 was being discussed, foundation Director E. Knapp underscored the special importance of basic research in securing long-range economic growth and pointed out the need to reinforce the research base of universities and colleges. The draft federal budget for 1985 envisages a 10-percent increase in expenditures on non-military basic research and an increase in the NSF budget, including a rise (of 22 percent) in expenditures on the operation and renewal of scientific instruments and equipment. Funds for military research, however, will increase by 22 percent.

Budget financing has a serious effect on the development of the material and technical base of science. The government secures around a fifth of all investments in fixed capital just through direct capital financing--that is, grants and contracts for the purchase of scientific equipment. A high percentage of capital expenditures is covered by budget funds for R & D grants and contracts (indirect capital financing). For example, the ratio of direct to indirect government financing in capital expenditures on research in universities and colleges is 1:4. A large portion (from 60 to 85 percent) of the government-funded capital expenditures on R & D is used for the financing of federal laboratories and contracted centers.

Budget financing is used for the development of the more costly elements of the material and technical base (reactors, nuclear accelerators, aerodynamic pipes, radio telescopes and other equipment, primarily one of a kind, for basic research, as well as buildings and other facilities). In view of the fact that government capital investments are linked primarily with basic research, it is influenced by an increase or decrease in this budget item.

The expansion and renewal of the material and technical base of science are stimulated by government depreciation regulations. Equipment depreciation terms were reduced twice in the 1970's (from 18 to 5 years). In 1981 the term was reduced to 3 years for scientific equipment and computers.

The lower level of investments in the material and technical base of science in the 1970's affected the rate of fixed capital accumulation and the ratio of technical equipment to the labor of scientists and engineers engaged in R & D projects. According to some estimates,⁵ fixed capital in the R & D sphere increased 2.3-fold between 1965 and 1980, and the capital-labor ratio rose 1.7-fold. The growth rates of fixed capital and the capital-labor ratio were almost twice as high in the 1960's, however, as in the 1970's.

According to our calculations,⁶ the fixed capital of research labs in the U.S. processing industry in 1980 represented around 6.5 percent of the value of fixed capital in this sector. The capital-labor ratio of researchers (scientists and engineers) was equivalent to 78,600 dollars (in 1972 prices). The per capita figure--that is, including technicians and other service personnel--was 26,700 dollars, which was slightly higher than the capital-labor ratio for the processing industry.

The different levels of financing for the material and technical base in various scientific sectors also resulted in different capital-labor ratios. The private sector is made up of more than 18,000 laboratories, institutes and research centers. They belong to 15,000 industrial companies. The public sector takes in around 700 government and semi-government labs, including 46 federal contracted centers⁷ (9 of them, belonging to the Department of Energy, function as national centers) and more than 5,500 research institutes of higher academic institutions and non-profit organizations.

In the 1970's total capital investments per employee in federal labs were around 50,000 dollars, while the figure for contracted centers was 150,000 (in 1972 prices). Since the average service life of scientific instruments and installations is less than 10 years, these data provide some idea of the active portion of fixed capital in the capital-labor ratio. Expenditures on technical equipment for labs during the same period averaged 4.5 million dollars per federal lab and 104 million per contracted center.⁸

The national centers have the strongest technical base. For example, the fixed capital of the Department of Energy's national centers was estimated at 25 billion dollars in 1981, and the capital-labor ratio for scientists and engineers was 1 million dollars (current prices).⁹

The capital-labor ratio of researchers in VUZ labs is quite high. It is almost equal to that of contracted centers when instruments and equipment used for

academic purposes are included. Total investments in the fixed capital of VUZ labs in the 1970's were 115,000 dollars per scientist and engineer. The capital-labor ratio for the 320 largest universities conferring doctorates and accounting for 98 percent of all academic R & D expenditures was around 170,000 dollars (1972 prices). All other universities spent meager amounts on technical equipment in those same years--7,000 dollars per person.¹⁰

The government's share of financing for the technical research base of academic institutions ranged from 20 to 26 percent in the last decade, including 3-6 percent in grants and contracts. In the 1960's the latter item represented a fourth or more of all university and college capital expenditures. Since it was intended primarily for purchases of costly instruments, sharp cuts in government financing had a serious negative effect on the state of the technical base of university science.

The reduced investments in the fixed capital of VUZ scientific labs lowered the quality of technical equipment for research. There was a higher percentage of obsolete equipment, which had a particularly adverse effect on the development of basic science. According to a survey of 54 labs at 10 universities and the labs of 2 large U.S. industrial firms, for example, 50 percent of the scientific instruments were purchased 3.5 years ago by the firms and 7 years ago by the VUZ's.¹¹ An NSF inventory of scientific equipment in VUZ labs in 1982 indicated that only 16 percent was classified by researchers as equipment meeting current requirements.¹²

The declining quality of the material and technical base of university research is a cause for worry in the U.S. scientific community.

The private scientific sector is in a better position than university science as far as the financing of the material and technical base is concerned, but the range of lab equipment and capital-labor ratios is quite broad in this sector. According to an estimate,¹³ total capital investments by private companies in the fixed capital of scientific subdivisions per scientist and engineer in the 1970's were 90,000 dollars (1972 prices), which is comparable to data for VUZ labs and is much lower than the indicator for federally contracted centers. In terms of technical equipment, the labs of the largest industrial companies and the national labs are on the same level. For example, 138 companies accounting for 75 percent of the R & D investments in the private sector spent around a million dollars per employee in the 1970's, whereas the rest spent an average of 24,000 dollars. These indicators reflect the extreme differences in the material and technical base of the private sector and, as a result, the functional specialization of large and small companies. The leading role of small companies in the development of inventions and constructive ideas for innovations is well known, but their final development, full-scale production and commercial sale are often only within the capabilities of large companies with strong scientific and technical potential.

In general, private companies are affected much less by fluctuations in budget funding.

An analysis of the capital expenditures and technical equipment levels of various R & D subdivisions indicates that the material and technical base of

American science is distinguished by the high concentration of technical equipment in leading research organizations and by substantial differences in the capital-labor ratio. Federal labs apparently represent the weakest link in terms of this ratio. A study conducted in 1983 revealed serious shortcomings in their work. It turned out that "many of them do not meet the quality and output standards expected of them."¹⁴ University labs also require technical renewal and renovation.

The rising value of the fixed capital of science and the rising capital-labor ratio in the last decade were accompanied by a qualitative change in the technical equipment, indicating the start of a fundamental technical reorganization of the R & D sphere through the accelerated development of the group of branches producing scientific instruments.

Scientific Instrument Building

Electronics, and microelectronics in particular, became the basis of rapid progress in scientific instrument building, with a tremendous effect on the methods and instruments of research. A genuine revolution has taken place in analytical instrument building in the last 10 years, radically heightening the technical potential, effectiveness and reliability of products.

Microprocessors give instruments the properties of the automatic selection of the optimal operational speed, self-control and self-diagnosis, which considerably reduces the amount of time required for measurement and the acquisition of useful information and reduces the adjustment, installation and repair costs of equipment. The use of microprocessors in measuring instruments is gradually eliminating the need for many manual operations. This reduces the amount of time required for measurements to a fraction of the previous figure while heightening accuracy substantially. Instruments with automatic functions are becoming commonplace and are relieving the researcher of the need to perform monotonous routine operations and compounding the productivity of his labor.

The use of calculators in instruments heightens their metrological reliability and sensitivity and allows for the use of methods of measurement ensuring a level of resolving power unattainable in the past due to difficulties in the control of instruments or the need to process huge quantities of intermediate data in real time. In instruments of some categories the use of calculating devices can simplify the purely measuring functions, and the results can then be processed for reliable information. The idea of creating completely or partially automated systems of research lab control is based precisely on the combination of these instruments and computers. These systems can control and direct the work of a group of scientific instruments, analyze data, plan and choose optimal conditions for scientific experiments, exchange information with automated data banks and supervise lab operations.

The first automated lab control system was displayed by Perkin-Elmer, an American instrument company, at an exhibit in Pittsburg in 1981. It was joined in 1983 by the systems of the Hewlett-Packard and Varian companies. The first company's control system represented a multileveled system of

computers. The first level controls the operations of microprocessors built into instruments and the initial processing of data. The second level is for the final processing of information, which is conveyed in a form convenient for use. The two levels are part of a lab information control system directing procedures connected with the selection, registration, processing and in-laboratory transfer of specimens and the use of experimental data, as well as the issuance of operational economic information needed for the management of the lab. Automated systems of analytical instruments can also include robots.

The latest development in the automation of research labs is the use of personal computers as so-called "workstations." These stations, established on the basis of microcomputers (16 or 32 bits), can direct several instruments, collect and analyze data received from them, transmit necessary information to larger computers and receive instructions from them.¹⁵

The mainstream of technical progress in instrument building is computerization, but the modularization, hybridization and miniaturization of instruments also seem promising from the standpoint of standardized operations and lower costs. Modularization, for example, has become one of the main trends in the production of gas and liquid chromatographs.

The increasing complexity of analytical instruments is raising their prices by leaps and bounds. The prices of scientific instruments costing over 5,000 dollars rose 20 percent a year between 1970 and 1978. The cost of some widely used analytical instruments, such as mass spectrometers with high resolving power, has reached half a million dollars.

These rising costs are increasing the average value of the researcher's workstation and expenditures on the initial equipping of labs. In the field of inorganic chemistry, for example, capital expenditures on new labs rose 6.3-fold in the 1970's (from 124,500 dollars to 785,000),¹⁶ including the lab's own equipment and the departmental instrumental center for costly analytical equipment for general use. The average cost of the unit of equipment belonging directly to the lab rose from 900 dollars to 5,000, and the cost of equipment belonging to the departmental center rose from 29,000 to 106,000 dollars.

The increasing complexity of scientific instruments is attaching special importance to their maintenance and repair. Whereas the maintenance of the instrument was once the responsibility of the researcher, these functions must now be performed by specially trained technicians. The cost of the repair and preventive maintenance of lab equipment is also rising, and has been estimated at from 10 to 30 percent of its value.

Technical research equipment is developed and produced in a number of engineering industries, primarily electronic engineering and the optical instrument industry. Analytical electronic and optical instruments account for the highest percentage of technical research equipment. The output of the latter increased 4.5-fold in the United States between 1965 and 1980 (1972 prices); they account for around 80 percent of all electronic and optical equipment.¹⁷

Around 70 percent of all electronic instruments are chromatographs, spectrophotometers and spectrometers. Spectrometer production has displayed the quickest growth. Computers (large and mini), microprocessors, electronic calculators and electronic components of automated systems of scientific instruments are being used more and more widely in scientific research. The total output of optical and electronic instruments and calculators accounted for around 8 percent of all expenditures on science in 1980. This does not include the large group of general-purpose electronic and optical control and measurement devices, used in scientific research and in production processes.

The group of industries manufacturing scientific instruments is categorized as one of the most science-intensive in terms of expenditures and the number of scientists and engineers per 1,000 employees. In 1979 there were 47 engineers and scientists per 1,000 employees in optical instrument engineering (as compared to the average of 28), and R & D expenditures represented 6.4 percent of sectorial sales (as compared to the industrywide figure of 3.1 percent). The indicators were even higher in electronic instrument building.

The firms belonging to this group have fairly strong scientific and production potential, allowing for the development and the individual and series production of almost all types of modern scientific equipment and accessories. Scientists themselves play an important role in the development and perfection of scientific instruments. The idea of a new scientific method and the appropriate instrument often arises as a by-product of the development of a new technology, as in the case of the scanning electronic microscope. Scientists also suggest improvements in instruments. A survey conducted in 1981 indicated that 32 of the 44 improvements made in instruments purchased for research were suggested by university scientists.¹⁸

The new level of technical progress in scientific instrument building is giving rise to many problems connected with the accelerated obsolescence, rapidly rising costs and increasing complexity of instruments and their systems. Above all, these are the problems of financing the renewal and renovation of the material and technical base, repair and maintenance, and the training of skilled technicians.

Changes in scientific technology have led to the replacement of solitary researchers with research teams. This was the case in the overwhelming majority (90 percent) of labs surveyed in 1982.¹⁹ In turn, this requires the complete replacement of their equipment, constructed in the form of a series of modules intended for individual researchers. The replacement of conventional equipment with automated systems is being carried out more intensely. Around 60 of the 81 labs surveyed were using automated equipment.

One of the most important problems of the material and technical base of science is the rapid aging of instruments. The total value of obsolete and worn instruments in the labs of VUZ's and industry was estimated at 1.5-2 billion dollars in 1982.²⁰ In the future these difficulties will not disappear but will grow even more acute, because progress in scientific instruments

is leading to increased complexity and higher costs. More efficient methods of producing and using research equipment could alleviate the problems to some extent. In the production sphere there has been a move to the modular principle of design, the standardization of parts and components and the installation of self-control and diagnostic devices on instruments. Specialized repair and maintenance services are being established, including the post-sale services offered to clients by manufacturing firms. These services are a relatively new aspect of the production process in instrument building. Material and technical support services are also being organized in the system of technical information.

The U.S. Department of Energy has an office providing information about the location of unique equipment, its technical features, its spheres of use and the conditions of its use. Some federal agencies have informal information systems on the location of unique types of scientific equipment. In view of the demand for these data, a complete inventory of research facilities available for public use in the labs of federal agencies, including national centers, has been suggested. The inventory records could be included in the information systems serving these agencies. A research facility data bank for computerized information retrieval would aid in finding needed equipment quickly.

The collective use of scientific instruments is being practiced more widely in various forms. University instrument centers (or labs) are being established, for example, on the departmental or universitywide level. Various scientific organizations are cooperating on joint research projects. Cooperative university-industrial centers include those founded at the suggestion and expense of the National Science Foundation. These centers are generally established in universities and serve to unite the financial resources of industrial firms with the scientific potential (personnel and technical) of universities. In all, more than 100 such centers have been organized in the United States, including 20 financed by the NSF.²¹

The cooperative centers conduct basic and applied research in fields of interest to participating firms. For example, a center founded by the NSF at North Carolina State University in 1982 conducts research in communication and has eight companies among its cooperating partners, including Exxon, IBM, ITT and others. For 5 years the center will be financed jointly by the NSF, the university and the industrial companies, after which it should be self-supporting and be financed completely by private companies. Another form of scientific cooperation uniting the resources of various organizations is the research consortium.²² More than 125 consortiums in the United States unite over 1,250 academic institutions and non-profit organizations, and even some firms. One recently founded consortium is an association of 13 of the largest firms in microelectronics and the computer industry, which are pooling their resources and sharing the costs of long-term (5-10 years) joint research programs.

Scientific pools are groups of private and government labs and science-intensive production units, generally centering their operations at universities and making use of their services. In 1981 there were 27 such pools, formed mainly in the 1960's, in the United States.

They include the Stanford Research Park, uniting 80 establishments (26,000 people); Triangle Park--40 organizations (20,000 people); University City Science Center--65 organizations (4,500 people); the MIT park--14 scientific establishments (2,500 employees); Purdue Industrial Park--25 organizations (1,600 people) and the Princeton Forrestal Center--32 organizations (1,300 people).

The national laboratories of the Department of Energy, contracted centers by status, are centers for the collective use of scientific installations and instruments for research in the sphere of nuclear and non-nuclear power engineering and the protection of the environment against radioactive contamination. In contrast to other such centers, they have a complete set of interrelated types of scientific equipment and the means of their maintenance for theoretical research (there is no equipment of this kind in the private sector). As a rule, their research facilities are unique. The scientific equipment in their collections is so costly or complex that its duplication would be counterproductive. Necessary auxiliary services are located on the territory of the lab so that outside researchers can perform experiments there; minor repairs are covered by the Department of Energy; the equipment is designed to be used without risk to health or life and without any risk of breakdown.

The national electronic microscope center, equipped with a unique set of electronic microscopes for various purposes, in the Lawrence National Laboratory (in Berkeley) is an example of a complete set of equipment intended for collective use. The firms using this equipment include the largest U.S. firms.

The collective use of this kind of equipment was practiced even earlier by federal labs and academic research institutes. What is new about this practice is that large stable groups of clients are being formed around national labs and are being offered a substantial portion of machine time, the equipment and the services connected with its operation. The research facilities of the Argonne National Laboratory, for example, are used by 11 industrial firms and institutes, and Brookhaven's facilities are used by 23. Payment for the use of equipment depends on whether the research findings are to be made public or kept confidential by the client firm. If the results are to be made public, no fee is charged. The organization pays only for computer time and other auxiliary services. If, on the other hand, the results are to be confidential, the organization pays an hourly rate, including overhead costs and depreciation.

Six national laboratories offer outside researchers the use of over 20 large experimental facilities of various types for basic and applied research. These include a high-voltage electronic microscope, a screening chamber for work with highly radioactive substances, an intensive impulse neutron source, the Argonne National Laboratory battery testing station, the Brookhaven National Laboratory synchronous radiation source and others.

The development of a subcontracting system similar to the one used in industry is an important way of economizing on scientific instruments in the R & D sphere. The division of scientific projects into separate sections is

practiced as part of the federal contract system for large-scale programs in space and military research.

Outside of this sphere, however, the subcontracting system is used only on a limited scale in R & D. The unification of specialized research facilities to carry out a scientific program, however, is an important factor reducing technical equipment costs, heightening the productivity of the researcher's labor and enhancing the quality of all the work on the program.

Finally, the practice of renting analytical instruments (gas and liquid chromatographs, optical spectrometers and others) is having some impact in this area. For example, Instrument Rentals, an American company, rents out optical and electronic instruments on a daily basis through its four regional centers. The monthly rental cost is equivalent to around 10 percent of the list price of the instrument, not counting shipping and installation costs.

The productive labor and efficient functioning of science are depending more and more on the automation of auxiliary operations, including the control of scientific research. The use of computers, systems of automated analytical equipment and automated information systems is introducing the element of mechanization into some stages of the scientific process and thereby giving a new slant to the problem of labor productivity in this highly labor-intensive sphere of human activity.

The technical equipping of scientific research is now an important way of heightening the efficiency of labor in science. According to experts from Dow Chemical, for example, one researcher today is equivalent to 25 researchers 10 years ago in terms of operational efficiency due to the higher quality and level of technical equipment.²³

The automation of scientific research objectively establishes the prerequisites for the substantial acceleration of scientific and technical progress. The degree to which these opportunities are utilized will depend largely on the ability of state-monopolist capital to regulate this process and to make and implement the appropriate scientific and technical policy. The increased expenditures on military research and the intense militarization of science are obviously inconsistent with the need to stimulate technological progress because the results of military research are now less and less frequently used in civilian branches.

FOOTNOTES

1. The material and technical base of science consists of the resources and equipment used on a long- and short-term basis in research and development and concentrated in organizations specializing directly in R & D and in the performance of various related services.
2. "Academic Science, 1972-1977," Wash., 1980, pp 5, 6.
3. There are no U.S. statistics on total capital investments in science or data on the scientific subdivisions of industrial firms. The figures cited in this article are the calculations or estimates of the author and other researchers.

4. Calculated according to data in "Federal Funds for Research and Development, 1982, 1983 and 1984," Wash., 1984.
5. Estimated by V. V. Zubchaninov and V. I. Martsinkevich (Institute of World Economics and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences).
6. Calculated according to the running inventory method on the basis of data in: V. I. Gromeka, "SShA: nauka i obrazovaniye" [U.S. Science and Education], Moscow, 1976, p 52.
7. Contracted centers are the tax-exempt non-profit corporations with more than 70 percent of their operations financed through the federal budget allocations for the R & D programs of agencies directing and contracting these operations. Almost all of the contracted centers are under the jurisdiction of the Defense Department, NASA, Energy Department and NSF.
8. Calculated according to data in "Federal Funds for Research and Development" for the appropriate years.
9. OBSHCHESTVENNIYE NAUKI ZA RUBEZHOM. NAUKOVEDENIYE, 1983, No 1, p 41.
10. Calculated according to data in "National Patterns of Science and Technology Resources, 1981," Wash., 1981, p 58.
11. SCIENCE, 6 March 1981, p 1017, fig 1.
12. RESEARCH MANAGEMENT, 1984, No 5, p 5.
13. According to a survey of 20 large U.S. companies, capital investments represent from 15 to 18 percent of R & D expenditures (RESEARCH MANAGEMENT, 1980, No 5, pp 25-28).
14. RESEARCH MANAGEMENT, 1983, No 6, p 2; SCIENCE, 29 July 1983, pp 438-439.
15. SCIENCE, 6 April 1984, p 40.
16. Ibid., 6 March 1981, p 1017.
17. Calculated according to data in: "1967 Census of Manufactures," Wash., 1970; "U.S. Industrial Outlook, 1981," Wash., 1981, pp 353-360; ELECTRONICS, 1979-1982, No 1; "Predicasts Basebook," Cleveland (Ohio), 1980, pp 457, 505, 537.
18. SCIENCE, 6 March 1981, p 1017.
19. RESEARCH MANAGEMENT, 1982, No 6, p 2.
20. CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING NEWS, 8 November 1982, pp 25-26.
21. Ibid., 10 December 1984, p 36.

22. These are joint organizations founded for the management of large research projects beyond the capabilities of a single firm or institute. The consortiums can conduct the research projects directly or coordinate them, supply the necessary materials and technical equipment, perform communication and training functions or serve as an information exchange base.

23. RESEARCH MANAGEMENT, 1979, No 5, p 25.

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U.S. BOOK ON NON-NUCLEAR DEFENSE REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 85 (signed to press 17 Jun 85) pp 109-111

[Review by V. A. Mazing of book "Defense Without the Bomb. The Report of the Alternative Defense Commission," London and New York, Taylor and Francis Ltd., 1983, VII + 311 pages: "'Non-Nuclear Defense' as an Alternative to the Arms Race"]

[Text] Antiwar activists in the United States, Great Britain, the FRG and other NATO countries, experts on disarmament and arms control and public spokesmen worried about the nature and scales of military preparations are suggesting new ways of curbing the nuclear arms race. These suggestions cover a fairly broad range: from universal and total disarmament to limited measures for a freeze or restrictions on only some types and systems of nuclear weapons.

One of the most popular ideas put forth by Western supporters of nuclear disarmament is the idea of "non-nuclear defense." Its basic premises are set forth in the report of the Alternative Defense Commission.

The commission was founded in 1980 at the initiative and expense of the Lansbury House Trust Fund, an English philanthropic organization, and the Peace Research School of the University of Bradford. The commission had 16 members, including Director Frank Blakeby of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, former leader of the Liberal Party of Great Britain Viv Bingham, Professor James O'Connell of the University of Bradford, London University professor and one of the founders of the Pugwash Movement Joseph Rotblatt, member of the House of Commons David Ellis Thomas, transport workers union leader Ron Todd and others.

The main conclusion the commission members drew as a result of their study concerns the need to renounce the use, production and deployment of nuclear weapons (p 1). The authors of the report based this conclusion primarily on the fact that the reliability of nuclear deterrence seems unconvincing under present conditions, now that the use of nuclear weapons against another nuclear power could ultimately mean the end of one's own country. "If, on the other hand, the use of nuclear weapons seems irrational, no one will believe in the threat of their possible use," the commission report says (p 3).

Furthermore, it says, the problem of nuclear proliferation still exists. As long as nuclear powers have these weapons, there is the danger that other states will follow their example. Finally, the use of nuclear weapons in any case is morally untenable (p 4).

The authors express their worries that the possession of nuclear weapons and the presence of American bases on English territory are turning Great Britain into Washington's nuclear hostage, since the first strike from English territory will inevitably be followed by grim retribution.

The commission members also resolutely oppose the production, deployment and use of chemical and biological weapons. The catastrophic implications of the use of these weapons do not permit, in their opinion, their inclusion in the category of conventional weapons (p 14).

Questions about the development of the special Anglo-American nuclear relationship are discussed at length in the book. The English armed forces now include 4 submarines, each carrying 16 missiles with 3 warheads. The missiles are supplied by the United States and are directed through American satellites. These systems are categorized as strategic forces and are an organic part of NATO, although Great Britain has officially reserved the right of their independent use in the event of "extraordinary circumstances."

According to an existing Anglo-American agreement, by the mid-1990's the Polaris missiles should be replaced by Trident-2 (D-5) SLBM's, each of which will be equipped with 14, and not 3, MIRV'ed warheads.

Besides this, England has many tactical nuclear systems and medium-range nuclear weapons. For example, its air force has around 200 Vulcan, Buccaneer and Jaguar fighter planes carrying English bombs and Nimrod planes with American nuclear depth charges. The British army on the Rhine is equipped with American Lance missiles with a range of over 100 kilometers. It also has 16 M-110 howitzers and 50 M-109 guns, capable of firing nuclear ammunition. The deployment of 69 more M-109 guns has begun. The warheads for these three systems are under joint Anglo-American control, with a so-called "double key" system (pp 25-26).

Great Britain has become the location of an entire network of American military bases and installations during the postwar period. According to data in the report, the United States has 21 air force bases in Great Britain, 9 transport and fuel stations, 17 weapon depots, 7 ammunition depots, 38 communication centers, 10 reconnaissance installations and 3 radar and sonar observation posts.

The authors of the report recall that the joint Anglo-American communique of 1952 says that "the decision to use these bases in the event of extraordinary circumstances will be made by the Government of Her Majesty and the Government of the United States in line with the circumstances." But there is some worry, they say, that the United States might simply "forget" to consult London in the event of a crisis, especially since some of these installations are designated for the fulfillment of American "global commitments." Therefore, they write, Great Britain might come face to face with death even if it

should consider U.S. behavior in other parts of the world to be wrong or irresponsible.

Some military experts on both sides of the Atlantic, the report says, believe that current NATO strategy needs a number of changes. Above all, they feel that the NATO countries should make a no-first-use announcement similar to the USSR's. The authors of the report agree. The main argument in favor of this move, they feel, is the considerable reduction of the risk connected with the use of nuclear weapons: They will then perform a single function-- they will deter an attack. Otherwise, any use of these weapons by one side could escalate the conflict to the level of global catastrophe.

In the interests of this policy, the authors propose that tactical and theater nuclear weapons, posing the most tangible threat, be eliminated first. In the opinion of the authors, a ban should also be imposed on the deployment of new weapon systems in Europe, such as neutron munitions, Pershing II missiles and cruise missiles. A total and universal nuclear test ban treaty would also strengthen security in Europe and the rest of the world (p 36).

The members of the Alternative Defense Commission believe that Great Britain should convince other NATO countries, especially those in Western Europe, of the need to renounce medium-range nuclear weapons and chemical weapons. The supporters of nuclear disarmament believe that the acceptance of this non-nuclear approach by Western Europe will necessitate the use of diplomatic channels for the conclusion of an official agreement with the Soviet Union on the renunciation of these weapon systems by both sides.

Western Europe should also discard missile systems using conventional ammunition easily confused with nuclear ammunition. The authors put cruise missiles in this category (p 43).

Advocating multilateral agreements wherever possible, the commission believes that Great Britain should announce its renunciation of nuclear weapons and the elimination of all nuclear bases from its territory without any kind of preliminary conditions (p 51). Unilateral steps in this direction could make a constructive contribution to progress in talks with the United States and USSR, the report says, particularly since this will remove all questions about the jurisdiction of English nuclear forces.

One of the most serious problems England will face in the pursuit of a non-nuclear policy is connected with its membership in NATO. In the opinion of the majority of commission members, arguments in favor of Great Britain's withdrawal from the North Atlantic alliance are more convincing than arguments in favor of membership. For tactical reasons, however, they believe that it will nevertheless be better for England to remain a member of the bloc and promote the renunciation of nuclear strategy and the accomplishment of universal nuclear disarmament from within the alliance (p 108).

The possibility of turning NATO into a non-nuclear alliance is examined in the report. The commission members believe that this would be possible under the following conditions: the assumption of a no-first-use commitment by the North Atlantic alliance; the gradual but total renunciation of all

medium-range nuclear weapons; the removal of all American tactical nuclear systems from Europe, including nuclear missiles on submarines; the establishment of clear distinctions between NATO strategy and the U.S. strategy of nuclear deterrence (p 107).

One alternative to the current NATO military-political alliance could be, in the opinion of the report's authors, a West European defense association with conventional forces, the creation of which would signify a complete break with U.S. nuclear strategy and global policy.

It is true that the rest of the NATO members have not stated their views on the creation of a non-nuclear bloc and the unilateral nuclear disarmament of England. What position will France, the other European nuclear power, take? How will the United States react to this? The authors do not exclude the possibility that the United States might deploy more nuclear missiles in this case in order to "compensate for the weaknesses in Europe's defense resulting from the nuclear disarmament of Great Britain and the closure of American nuclear bases in this country" (p 250).

As for the current U.S. administration, the President and his closest advisers, just as members of the academic community who elaborate theories to justify the aggressive U.S. policy in international affairs, had an extremely negative reaction to the report of the English commission. Nevertheless, its conclusions are still being discussed widely in the United States as well as in European countries. This testifies that the Western public sees a solution to the current difficult international situation not in the continued escalation of the arms race, but in radical steps toward the limitation, reduction and eventual elimination of weapons.

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BOOK ON PRESENT AND FUTURE OF CAPITALIST ECONOMY REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 85 (signed to press 17 Jun 85) pp 114-115

[Review by N. P. Shmelev of book "Sovremennyye problemy i perspektivy mirovogo kapitalisticheskogo khozyaystva" [The Current Problems and Prospects of the World Capitalist Economy] by A. I. Shapiro, Moscow, Nauka, 1984, 304 pages]

[Text] The scales, severity and synchronous nature of the crises shaking the economic foundations of present-day capitalism have revived interest in studies dealing with the world capitalist economy as a whole, in all of its contradictory unity and diversity.

Which recent trends have had the greatest effect on the internal dynamics of present-day capitalism? Where are they leading? How will the main features of the world capitalist economy of the early 21st century differ from its salient features today, now that the technological revolution is essentially only beginning its process of international development, concentrated as yet primarily in the main capitalist centers but nevertheless spreading perceptibly farther and farther into the capitalist periphery? It is not an easy matter to answer these questions: It requires not only a knowledge of the facts about an issue as vast and complex as the state of the contemporary capitalist economy, but also the exceptional scientific initiative and remarkable scientific imagination required to cross the threshold separating the future from the present in analyses.

Besides this, it is also necessary to surmount the difficulties connected with the great variety of thorough and often highly professional Western works in the field of economic futurology. The researcher must not get lost in this sea of literature, but must recognize the elements with some basis in fact and discard all elements colored by bourgeois class restrictions while maintaining his scientific independence and stating his own substantiated point of view. In our opinion, the author of this book has been quite successful in performing this difficult task.

His ideas are based primarily on the general premise that the world economy of our era differs fundamentally from the economy of the period of unlimited capitalist dominion, prior to the establishment of socialist relations in a

number of countries on three continents. "The world economy today is not only and not merely a group of national economies connected by international division of labor; it is a complex economic system representing primarily the dialectical unity and struggle of opposites--the two world economic systems with their world markets and two opposite production methods: socialist and capitalist" (p 15). The author stresses (and quite correctly, in our opinion) that the world economy today is bipolar and not tripolar. The very existence of the second, socialist pole in the system of world economic relations affects the nature of all processes occurring in the world capitalist economy and all decisions made in developed capitalist and developing countries.

The author points up the increasing severity of the unresolved conflicts of contemporary capitalism but does not take an oversimplified or excessively direct approach to this distinctive feature of our era: "It is precisely the consistent growth, and not the stagnation, of productive forces that aggravates the decisive conflict between them and their inhibiting framework of capitalist production relations. Lenin's statement that capitalism as a whole displays a much higher rate of growth during its highest and last stage than before, and that its decay does not exclude the possibility of isolated periods of the accelerated development of certain areas of production and certain countries, is still completely accurate even in our day" (p 45). The technological revolution is objectively increasing opportunities for the expansion and acceleration of national production in the industrial centers and on the periphery of the capitalist world. We must remember that capitalism "still has advantages stemming from the higher level of social labor productivity in the most highly developed capitalist countries" (p 50).

The author feels that one of the most important features and perhaps one of the main problems of present-day capitalism is the tendency first noticed in the first half of the 1970's toward the close intermingling of its traditional, cyclical crises with various structural crises, the irreversible spread of all of capitalism's crisis symptoms beyond national boundaries and their transformation into a truly cosmopolitan or international phenomenon.

The international debt crisis is also growing in severity, and there have been radical changes in international currency and financial flow patterns. Finally, two built-in defects of the capitalist system have also become a truly international feature of world capitalism--inflation and incurable (neither by therapeutic nor surgical means) unemployment, especially in Western Europe.

In view of the global nature of these signs of crisis, the ratio of centripetal to centrifugal forces and of uniting to disuniting tendencies in capitalist intergovernmental relations is particularly meaningful. In the author's opinion, "the system of imperialist states is now living through a period of its history in which the uniting tendencies are inclined to be the strongest" (p 89). The book contains a thorough analysis of changes in the balance of power between the main centers of imperialism and the fierce competition between Western countries in world industrial markets (particularly in the case of goods requiring high scientific input), where the economic future of the capitalist world is perhaps being decided to a greater extent than in any other area.

In a review there is no room for even the briefest discussion of all of the issues examined in the work. In the next few decades, it is probable that the most significant issues will be major current trends, such as the dramatic structural reorganization of the economic potential of leading capitalist countries in favor of science-intensive industries and services, the heightened accessibility and interrelationship of national economies throughout the capitalist world and the intensification of state-monopolist tendencies in their international form. In connection with this, however, the author's attempts in some parts of the book to disregard the role of the market and market relations in the development of the contemporary capitalist economy seem invalid.

Marxists offer their own theory of the future as a contrast to futurological models of the "stability of capitalist society." The Marxist theory is based on a view of the development of human society as a natural historical process of the gradual change of socioeconomic structures, capitalism's inevitable departure from the stage of history and a transition to socialism. This, the author stresses, "is not a utopia, not a beautiful dream, but a real prospect" (p 301). And this is essentially the central thesis of the book.

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BOGDANOV BOOK ON NUCLEAR POLICY REVIEWED

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[Review by B. T. Yarik of book "Yadernoye bezumiye v range gosudarstvennoy politiki" [Nuclear Insanity on the Level of State Policy] by R. G. Bogdanov, Moscow, Izdatelstvo politicheskoy literatury, 1984, 240 pages: "Reckless Policy"]

[Text] The appearance of nuclear weapons in the world created an unprecedented threat to all human life. The extent of this danger is particularly apparent in our day, now that the current American administration, after its daily, frenzied buildup of the lethal arsenals of war, has raised the nuclear arms race to the level of the top priorities of its government policy.

The subject of this review is a thorough examination and exposure of Washington's reckless policy--the main cause of tension in today's world.

After analyzing all aspects of American imperialism's behavior on the international scene, the author defines the main U.S. strategic aims: a rise to the heights of world dominion and an attempt to smash the main obstacle--the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community. From this standpoint, a statement which is essentially the main conclusion of the book seems particularly pertinent: "An exceptional danger is being posed today by the most belligerent imperialist groups, striving to resolve their own conflicts and difficulties by preparing for war and by starting wars, including thermo-nuclear war, and displaying a willingness to gamble the vital interests of mankind for the sake of their own selfish goals" (p 5).

In a study of the causes of the Washington administration's overtly forcible, adventurist policy line, R. G. Bogdanov makes extensive use of recently declassified American documents to clearly demonstrate U.S. imperialism's organic hatred for socialism and for progressive changes in the world and its desire to settle scores with the aid of military force. The book contains documented proof of Washington's sinister plans, which have resulted, throughout the postwar period, in attempts to secure so-called "national interests" by involving the world in bloody adventures and establishing "the American style of order" in it (pp 51-97, 102-147). Constantly resorting to nuclear blackmail and threatening the use of these lethal weapons, the United States

has tried to employ them as the main instruments for the satisfaction of its global ambitions. The author's list of incidents of nuclear revenge against whole countries and peoples, planned by American leaders since Truman's time, compiled by the author on the basis of American documents (pp 22-23), warrants serious consideration in this connection. The author stresses that in the 40 years since Hiroshima was destroyed, "all American presidents from Truman to Reagan have considered the options or made serious preparations for the first use of tactical or strategic nuclear weapons" (p 21).

The counterproductivity and futility of the delirious plans of the instigators of war and their vain attempts to justify inhumane and irresponsible policy with the aid of myths about the "Soviet threat" are demonstrated conclusively in the book. These propaganda stereotypes only serve "to conceal hegemonic impulses and camouflage the thirst for unbridled expansion" (p 26). The author conclusively exposes the U.S. administration's "exemplary" love of peace and the American "double standard," which essentially dictates that the White House's permanent policy of militarism be camouflaged with sporadic peaceable declarations. R. G. Bogdanov dissects the lies and slander on which all of the anti-Soviet stereotypes of the U.S. administration's propaganda machine are built.

It is on the same basis that people in Washington today are trying to substantiate the "moral" and "humane" nature of Reagan's "star wars" program, presupposing the militarization of space for the realization of the long-cherished but delusive hope of military superiority to the USSR. R. G. Bogdanov reveals the real causes of Washington's allergy to treaties and agreements and the real purpose of the U.S. administration's futile attempts to reserve the "right" not to observe negotiated agreements.

The author's remarks about the role of the U.S. military-industrial complex, which has grown rich on the arms race and has become a self-contained force in the state, are of considerable interest (pp 10, 96-98). He reveals the reasons for the chauvinistic passions seizing Americans today and proves that the slogans about "American exclusivity" are artificial and serve only to justify U.S. plans to rule the world. In connection with this, the author discusses new aspects of American imperialism's current strategy of struggle for world power (pp 27-29). The mercenary and dictatorial style of U.S. foreign policy behavior toward the people of Latin America, Asia and Africa is described in convincing detail.

The essence of the Soviet Union's consistently peaceful foreign policy is analyzed at length in the book. The comprehensive, specific and logical analysis of Soviet peace initiatives, dictated primarily by concern for the fate of the human race and the desire to preserve and develop life on our planet, is noteworthy. Interacting closely with the countries of the socialist community, the USSR is persistently struggling to eliminate the danger of nuclear catastrophe by resolutely countering the policy of war with a policy of peace, insanity with sanity, confrontation with cooperation, and pessimism with optimism.

The author gradually leads the reader to the conclusion that the nuclear insanity of imperialist forces now poses a threat to all mankind.

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BOOK ON U.S. INDIAN OCEAN POLICY REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 85 (signed to press 17 Jun 85) pp 117-118

[Review by V. A. Kremenyuk of book "Politika SShA v Indiyskom okeane" [U.S. Policy in the Indian Ocean] by A. V. Krutskikh, Moscow, Nauka, Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1984, 256 pages]

[Text] This book by A. V. Krutskikh is distinguished by an attempt not only to analyze Washington's current behavior in the Indian Ocean but also to gain a thorough understanding of the fundamental tendencies increasing the international political significance of this region since the beginning of the 1970's and heightening the interest of U.S. military and diplomatic agencies in the region.

The author thoroughly analyzes the basic forms and methods of American interference in the internal affairs of countries located along the ocean's shores and the plans to use the "rapid deployment force," establish bridgeheads for aggression (bases and communication centers of the U.S. Armed Forces on the territory of dependent countries) and station naval forces here on a permanent basis. "Today the American fleet in the Indian Ocean," A. V. Krutskikh writes, "is a connecting link between NATO's military strength in Western Europe and the armed forces of the United States and its allies in the Pacific. With its aid, U.S. imperialism hopes to turn the Indian Ocean into an 'American lake' and control the straits connecting it with other seas and oceans in order to gain unrestricted control over the natural resources of the countries of this region and decide the political future of this part of the world" (p 106). The exceptional danger of the U.S. intention to turn the Indian Ocean countries into hostages of Washington's nuclear strategy is demonstrated in the book.

American imperialism's goal here, just as everywhere else, is military-political dominion. The author singles out the two main aspects of this policy--the creation of a neocolonial "sub-empire" made up of dependent and allied countries in the region and the organization of attempts to counteract the efforts of peaceful countries to turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace and cooperation.

The author presents a comprehensive study of the United States' military and political "partnership" in the Indian Ocean zone with its allies, especially

the members of the aggressive NATO and ANZUS blocs, and with local reactionary regimes within the framework of the theory of "shared responsibility and mutually supplementary effort," which has been around since the days of the "Nixon doctrine" but is being quite actively pursued today by the Reagan Administration. This "partnership" serves as a way of practicing imperialist solidarity in the suppression of the national liberation struggle in the region and the guarantee of U.S. strategic superiority. The imperialist "partnership" in all of its forms, the author writes, gives Washington a chance to pursue its policy in the Indian Ocean basin by relying on the geopolitics of the "balance of power"--that is, to create local seats of tension by setting some countries against others, such as Pakistan against India, Iran against Iraq, Saudi Arabia against Iraq and Iran, the two Yemens against each other, the socialist countries of Indochina against the ASEAN states, Somalia against its neighbors, etc.

Revealing the roots of Washington's military and political expansion in the Indian Ocean basin, the author devotes an entire chapter to the economic penetration of this region by the United States. This part of the work, which is filled with facts and figures, provides an extremely clear understanding of the specific interests of American ruling circles in the economic exploitation of Indian Ocean countries.

The author's attempt to expose the ideological myths American propaganda uses to justify U.S. expansion in the Indian Ocean and simultaneously distort the essence of Soviet policy in this region and undermine the faith of local countries in the Soviet Union is pertinent and is of great practical value. The Soviet Union has supported the littoral states' proposal that the Indian Ocean be turned into a zone of peace and that an international conference be convened as soon as possible by the United Nations for this purpose.

The author also analyzes the many Soviet proposals regarding the organization of peaceful cooperation with the countries of this region (pp 218-219).

One of the book's important merits is the abundance of factual material, which has been painstakingly classified by the author. It is possible that the study would have benefited from an examination of the diplomatic actions of states resisting American imperialism's plans in the region. Perhaps the author should have discussed all of the related problems in a separate chapter, to contrast and point up the differences in the positions of countries advocating the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean and countries opposing this idea, especially the United States.

In general, however, A. V. Krutskikh's book is a noteworthy event in Soviet historical science and will indisputably arouse the interest of the general reading public as well as experts on international affairs.

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U.S. BOOK ON POLICY IN ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEWED

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[Review by V. S. Rudnev of book "USA and the Islamic World" by A. Kislov and R. Zimenkov, New Delhi, Sterling Publishers Private Ltd., 1984, 80 pages: "Washington and the 'Islamic Factor'"]

[Text] There was a noticeable revival of various Islamic currents, especially fundamentalism, in some Muslim countries in the 1970's and 1980's, and this affected international relations. It is understandable that the United States, which had undertaken broad-scale political and economic expansion in some developing Muslim countries with the aid of a set of neocolonial methods, tried to adapt to this new turn of events.

On the basis of extensive documented information, Soviet researchers A. Kislov and R. Zimenkov have thoroughly analyzed the contradictory development of Islam in the Muslim countries. They have shown how Washington is trying to neutralize the objectively progressive, anti-imperialist tendencies in this area and to use the conservative features of Islamic fundamentalism in its own interests.

One of the chief merits of the work is that the authors examine their topic in its entirety. Furthermore, they cover all of the regions where Islam is prominent--from the Near and Middle East to Southeast Asia. Their analysis of the subversive methods the United States has practiced in Muslim countries in the political and economic spheres is equally comprehensive.

The book examines events since the late 1970's, when the "Islamic factor" began to acquire great importance in American foreign policy after the revolution in Iran. In an attempt to use some of the conservative dogmas of Islam, American neocolonialism armed itself with certain tendencies in the Muslim countries, such as the erection of artificial obstacles to impede progressive sociopolitical change and the escalation of anticommunist and anti-Soviet feelings in some of these countries. Washington has taken specific international political steps to reinforce these conservative aspects of the domestic policy of some Muslim states and is trying to undermine their political and economic relations with the socialist countries, including the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, Americans engaged in the theory and practice of neocolonialism often allege, as the authors of this monograph correctly stress, that the conflict between Islam and "Western values" is only temporary because the Western countries support religious beliefs and "respect" the Muslim religion. The problem here, however, is that this "respect" is accompanied, as the authors stress, by actions against the vital economic and political interests of the Muslim states.

Various forms of U.S. economic pressure on the Muslim countries are described in detail: There have been substantial cuts in food exports to these countries, combined with an increase in various types of protectionist measures against imports of goods from these countries.

American private capital investments in the Muslim countries are not contributing to their economic development. They serve only the interests of U.S. economic expansion and have been accompanied by increasing exports of profits from these countries and the transfer of hazardous forms of production and outdated technology to this region. The U.S. Government's "economic aid" is closely related to military-strategic interests and the needs of American private capital.

A. Kislov and R. Zimenkov also write about U.S. military-political expansion in the Muslim countries, which is extremely harmful to their national interests. In the 1970's and 1980's Washington repeatedly and openly threatened several Muslim countries with military force: Iran and some other states in the Middle East. It unceremoniously interferes in the domestic political affairs of these countries, using an entire group of methods to undermine undesirable regimes, particularly those adhering to an anti-imperialist line.

This book by A. Kislov and R. Zimenkov was prepared for publication by the NOVOSTI agency and was published in New Delhi.

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CHRONICLE OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS (MARCH-MAY 1985)

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 85 (signed to press 17 Jun 85) pp 125-127

[Text] 3-11 -- A delegation from the USSR Supreme Soviet, headed by member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine V. V. Shcherbitskiy, visited the United States as the guests of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. V. V. Shcherbitskiy had a meeting with President R. Reagan in the White House. The Soviet delegation and American congressmen discussed the prevention of nuclear war and the limitation and reduction of weapons.

4-11 -- The third meeting of representatives of the Association of Soviet Jurists and the American Lawyers Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control was held in Moscow.

8 -- Directives for the USSR delegation at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons were discussed and approved at a CPSU Central Committee Politburo meeting. It was emphasized that the Soviet side would take energetic and constructive action at the talks and would be unconditionally guided by the 8 January 1985 agreement stipulating that questions connected with nuclear and space weapons should be discussed and solved as a group.

11 -- A special CPSU Central Committee plenum was held, and M. S. Gorbachev was elected general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. In his speech at the plenum, M. S. Gorbachev reaffirmed that the USSR is not striving for unilateral advantages over the United States and the NATO countries or for military superiority to them; the USSR wants the cessation, and not the continuation, of the arms race, and real and substantial reductions in accumulated weapons, and not the constant development of new weapon systems, whether in space or on earth.

President R. Reagan, Secretary of State G. Shultz and National Security Adviser R. McFarlane visited the Soviet embassy in the United States. They sympathized with the government and people of the Soviet Union for the loss of K. U. Chernenko.

12 -- The first round of Soviet-American talks in Geneva on nuclear and space weapons began. Delegations met for plenary sessions on 12, 19 and 21 March.

13 -- In the Kremlin, M. S. Gorbachev received U.S. Vice-President G. Bush, the head of the U.S. delegation at K. U. Chernenko's funeral. The meeting was attended by Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko and U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz. Views were exchanged on important aspects of Soviet-American relations and the state of affairs in the world.

18 -- Speaking in the Canadian province of Quebec, President Reagan announced that he was "willing to work with the Soviet Union toward more constructive bilateral relations." The President also made some hostile comments about the USSR.

21 -- In Moscow A. A. Gromyko received U.S. Ambassador A. Hartman at his request. They discussed various aspects of bilateral relations and some international issues.

21-31 -- A delegation from the USSR Chamber of Commerce visited the United States.

26 -- Acting on orders, the Soviet embassy in Washington issued a protest to the U.S. State Department in connection with the incident involving American serviceman A. Nicholson on the territory of a Soviet military installation in Germany and demanded that the American side take the necessary steps for the strict observance of the 1947 agreement on military communication missions.

The following meetings were held as part of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons:

26 -- A meeting of the group on space weapons;

27 -- A meeting of the group on strategic weapons;

28 -- A meeting of the group on medium-range nuclear weapons.

28-30 -- Representatives of the Soviet and American UN associations met in Moscow.

April

2 -- Soviet Ambassador A. F. Dobrynin had a meeting with G. Shultz in Washington to discuss the entire range of Soviet-American relations.

The following meetings were held in Geneva at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons:

2, 9, 16, 19, 22 -- Meetings of the group on space weapons;

3, 10, 17 -- Meetings of the group on strategic weapons;

4, 16, 18 -- Meetings of the group on medium-range nuclear weapons.

7-12 -- A delegation from the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress, headed by Speaker of the House T. O'Neill, visited the Soviet Union as the

guests of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The American congressmen attended discussions in the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR ministries of foreign trade and agriculture and were received by member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko.

8 -- The text of M. S. Gorbachev's conversation with the editor of PRAVDA was published. During the talk M. S. Gorbachev suggested that the USSR and the United States put a moratorium on the development, including research, the testing and the deployment of offensive space weapons and a freeze on strategic offensive arms for the entire period of the Geneva talks. This should be accompanied by the cessation of the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe and Soviet reciprocal measures. M. S. Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would put a moratorium on the deployment of its medium-range missiles and stop taking other reciprocal measures in Europe from 7 April to November this year.

10 -- M. S. Gorbachev received Speaker of the House T. O'Neill in the Kremlin. During their conversation, M. S. Gorbachev stressed that the Soviet Union is sincerely striving to reach concrete agreements in Geneva and wants Soviet-American relations to return to the channel of normal and mutually beneficial cooperation and mutual respect.

11 -- A TASS news release was published to report that A. A. Gromyko and G. Shultz would meet in Vienna on 14 May 1985 by mutual agreement to discuss matters of mutual interest.

12 -- Ronald Reagan granted the English TIMES newspaper an interview, during which he called the USSR's announced decision to put a moratorium on the deployment of its medium-range missiles and stop other reciprocal measures in Europe until November 1985 a "propaganda move."

12,23 -- Delegations met for plenary sessions at the Soviet-American Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons.

13 -- A TASS statement condemning the U.S. administration's hostile behavior toward Nicaragua was published.

15 -- Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade N. S. Patolichev and Minister of the Food Industry V. P. Lein received D. Kendall, a prominent member of the U.S. business community and chairman of the board of PepsiCo, Inc.

23 -- At a regular plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, M. S. Gorbachev reaffirmed the Soviet Union's willingness to improve relations with the United States for mutual benefit and without any attempts to infringe upon one another's legitimate rights and interests. He said that at the Geneva talks the American side was violating the January agreement on the interconnection of three issues--the prevention of the arms race in space, the reduction of nuclear strategic arms and the reduction of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. M. S. Gorbachev expressed the hope that adjustments could be made in the U.S. position to provide an opportunity for mutually acceptable agreements.

23 -- The first round of the Soviet-American talks in Geneva on nuclear and space weapons came to an end. The beginning of the next round was scheduled for 30 May.

26 -- On the 40th anniversary of the meeting of Soviet and American troops on the Elbe, M. S. Gorbachev sent greetings to the veterans who had gathered in Torgau.

29 -- The U.S. State Department issued a statement in which it tried to distort the principled Soviet position at the Geneva talks and alleged that the United States is supposedly "willing to seriously consider" Soviet proposals aimed at curbing the arms race.

May

1 -- The new U.S. Department of Commerce regulations envisaging further restrictions on American exports to the USSR and other socialist countries went into effect.

6 -- Soviet Defense Minister and Marshal of the Soviet Union S. L. Sokolov's responses to the questions of a TASS correspondent on military and political aspects of Soviet-U.S. relations were published. They specifically stressed the aggressive nature of President Reagan's "strategic defense initiative."

8 -- Speaking in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses at festivities commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War, M. S. Gorbachev said that "the entire experience of the anti-Hitler coalition proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that states with opposite social natures can unite their efforts in the struggle against a common enemy, find mutually acceptable solutions and take effective action for the sake of a common goal."

9 -- M. S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan exchanged messages on the 40th anniversary of the victory over Hitler's Germany.

12-17 -- A group of representatives from the UN Business Council, an American public organization, visited Moscow. Council members attended discussions in USSR Gosplan, the USSR Chamber of Commerce, the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Soviet UN Association.

14 -- There was a meeting in Vienna between A. A. Gromyko, who was there to attend festivities commemorating the 30th anniversary of the state treaty with Austria, and G. Shultz. They discussed a wide range of matters of mutual interest to the USSR and United States.

18-22 -- An American government delegation, headed by Secretary of Commerce M. Baldrige, came to the USSR to attend the seventh session of the inter-governmental joint Soviet-American commission on trade in Moscow.

20 -- M. S. Gorbachev received M. Baldrige in the Kremlin. The meeting was attended by USSR Minister of Foreign Trade N. S. Patolichev, U.S. Ambassador A. Hartman and White House staffer J. Matlock. The secretary of commerce delivered a letter from Ronald Reagan, expressing a general hope for relatively broader trade between the United States and the USSR. M. S. Gorbachev said that the unsatisfactory state of Soviet-American trade and economic relations is the result of the U.S. administration's policy of discriminating against the Soviet Union, the attempts to interfere in its internal affairs and the use of trade as a means of political pressure.

27 -- A PRAVDA editorial on "Geneva: What Did the First Round of Talks Prove?" analyzed the state of affairs at the Geneva USSR-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons. It said that the American delegation had taken an unconstructive stand and was openly sabotaging the discussion and determination of ways of preventing an arms race in space.

In an interview in the Italian newspaper TEMPO, R. Reagan alleged that his administration is striving for "substantial progress" at the Geneva talks. Furthermore, he completely distorted the USSR's position by trying to blame it for the absence of concrete results during the first round.

30 -- The second round of Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons began in Geneva.

31 -- The group on strategic weapons met at the Geneva talks.

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